Evaluating benefits and harms of screening - the streetlight effect? by Johansson, Minna
	   
 
Evaluating benefits and harms of screening 
- the streetlight effect? 
 
Minna Johansson 
	  
Department of Public Health  
and Community Medicine 
/Primary Health Care,  
Institute of Medicine at  
Sahlgrenska Academy 
University of Gothenburg 
 
Gothenburg, Sweden, 2018 
	   
 
 
Cover illustration by Sebastian Dijkstra 
 
Evaluating benefits and harms of screening – the streetlight effect? 
© 2018 Minna Johansson 
minna.johansson@vgregion.se 
 
ISBN 978-91-7833-003-4 
 
Printed in Gothenburg, Sweden 2018 
BrandFactory AB 
	   
 
To my grandfather Sigvard 
for the joy in your eyes when you looked at me 
and for the courage you gave me 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   
	   
Abstract 
The general aim of this thesis was to explore how the benefits and harms of 
screening for a potentially life-threatening disease can be evaluated.  
Papers I and II are a Cochrane Systematic Review on screening for malignant 
melanoma. We found no randomised trials of the benefits and harms of 
screening for malignant melanoma. We concluded that due to the uncertainty 
of benefits, and risk of harms through overdiagnosis and opportunity costs, 
screening for malignant melanoma should not be recommended outside the 
confines of a well-designed, randomised trial. However, screening for malig-
nant melanoma is already widely adopted in the Western world.  
Papers III and IV explore screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA). In 
study III, we found that AAA screening has been introduced in several coun-
tries without adequate investigation of harms. We also found that AAA 
screening caused harm through the detection and subsequent surgery of 
AAAs that would never have caused symptoms (i.e. overdiagnosis and over-
treatment). Study IV is a registry study of the benefits and harms of AAA 
screening in Sweden. We found that AAA-mortality in Swedish men aged 65-
74 has dropped by about 70% in the last decades. Screening had, at best, a 
minor effect on the decline in AAA-mortality, which was likely caused mainly 
by reduced smoking. We estimated that for every 10 000 men invited, 2 men 
(95% CI -3 to 7) avoided AAA-death (not statistically significant). At the 
same time, 49 men were likely overdiagnosed (95% CI 25 to 73), of whom 19 
men (95% CI 1 to 37) had unnecessary surgery with a risk of mortality and 
morbidity. The remaining 30 men were offered regular follow-up with poten-
tial psychosocial consequences. The effect on AAA-mortality in Sweden was 
only 7% of that in the largest randomised trial. The less favourable benefit-to-
harm balance brings into question the continued use of AAA screening. 
The overall conclusion of this thesis is that benefits of screening receive much 
more attention and appreciation than harms. 
Key Words: Abdominal aortic aneurysm, Benefits, Harms, Malignant melano-
ma, Mortality, Overdiagnosis, Overtreatment, Screening
	   
Sammanfattning på 
svenska 
Poängen med screening är att hitta och behandla farlig sjukdom i ett tidigt 
stadium. För de flesta av oss låter detta intuitivt tilltalande. Men när vi  
undersöker människor utan symtom riskerar vi att orsaka skada. Det beror 
framförallt på att många av oss lever med avvikelser i våra kroppar som skulle 
tolkas som sjukdom om de hittades, men som aldrig kommer att ge några 
symtom. Problemet är att vi ofta inte kan skilja de avvikelser som kommer att 
orsaka sjukdom från de som aldrig kommer att orsaka sjukdom. Därför leder 
screening till att vissa människor i onödan får en diagnos (överdiagnostik) och 
att vissa av dem i onödan genomgår en behandling (överbehandling).  
 
I denna avhandling har för- och nackdelar med screening för malignt  
melanom och screening för bukaortaaneurysm undersökts.  
 
Malignt melanom är en cancer i huden som kan orsaka död genom metastaser 
till andra organ. Screening för melanom görs oftast genom att en läkare tittar 
över huden hos människor utan misstanke om melanom. Screening för  
melanom är utbrett i västvärlden. Vi undersökte om det finns vetenskapliga 
belägg från randomiserade studier för att screening för melanom leder till mer 
nytta än skada, vilket normalt är ett krav för att screening ska rekommenderas. 
Vi fann att det saknas belägg för att screening leder till någon nytta i form av 
minskad död i melanom. Det finns vissa belägg från befolkningsstatistik för 
att screening leder till skada i form av överdiagnostik och överbehandling. 
Slutsatsen blev att screening för melanom inte bör rekommenderas. 
 
Bukaortaaneurysm är en utvidgning av den stora kroppspulsådern. Buk-
aortaaneurysm ger oftast inga symtom om det inte spricker. Om det spricker 
är dödligheten hög, över 80 procent. Screening för bukaortaaneurysm har 
införts i Sverige, Storbritannien och USA. Screeningen görs genom en  
ultraljuds-undersökning av magen hos 65-åriga män. Vi undersökte först om 
nackdelar med screening för bukaortaaneurysm har utvärderats och kom fram 
till att det saknas forskning på nackdelar med screeningen. Vi fann också att 
	   
screening orsakar skada genom att man hittar bukaortaaneurysm som aldrig 
skulle ha orsakat symtom om mannen i fråga inte hade deltagit i screening 
(överdiagnostik). Konsekvensen är att dessa män i onödan får leva med  
vetskapen om att de har ett bukaortaaneurysm, vilket kan påverka livskvalitén. 
Dessutom genomgår vissa av dessa män i onödan en operation för sitt  
aneurysm (överbehandling). Operationen har en risk för allvarliga  
komplikationer och död.  
 
Screening för bukaortaaneurysm infördes efter att studier från 1980- och  
90-talen visat att screening minskar risken att dö i bukaortaaneurysm. Sedan 
dess har förekomsten av bukaortaaneurysm minskat kraftigt. Detta beror  
troligen på minskad rökning. När förekomst och dödlighet av den sjukdom 
man screenar för minskar så minskar också nyttan av screening, och balansen 
mellan skada och nytta av screening försämras oftast. Vi undersökte därför 
nyttan (minskad död i bukaortaaneurysm) och skadan (överdiagnostik och 
överbehandling) av det svenska screeningprogrammet för bukaortaaneurysm. 
Vi fann att nyttan med screening har sjunkit kraftigt jämfört med de studier 
som låg till grund för att screeningen infördes. Balansen mellan skada och 
nytta har också försämrats eftersom de skadliga effekterna inte har minskat 
lika mycket. Vi beräknade att per 10 000 män som kallas till screening  
kommer 2 män undvika död i bukaortaaneurysm (men denna effekt var inte 
statistiskt säkerställd). Samtidigt kommer 49 män i onödan få en buk-
aortaaneurysm-diagnos (bli överdiagnosticerade) och 19 av dem kommer i 
onödan att genomgå en förebyggande operation med risk för död och  
allvarliga komplikationer (bli överbehandlade). Vi kom till slutsatsen att det är 
tveksamt om nyttan med screening för bukaortaaneurysm överväger skadan, 
och att det svenska screeningprogrammet därför bör omvärderas. 
 
Malignt melanom och bukaortaaneurysm kan orsaka svår sjukdom och för 
tidig död. Det finns en stark tro bland forskare, politiker, vårdpersonal och 
allmänheten att screening, genom tidig upptäckt av dessa sjukdomar, ska 
kunna lindra detta lidande. Men förhoppningen att screening ska leda till nytta 
omsätts inte alltid i praktiken, och screening leder också till skada. När vården 
aktivt kallar människor till en undersökning som de inte har bett om är det 
viktigt att vi är säkra på att den undersökningen leder till mer nytta än skada. 
Denna avhandling är ägnad den uppgiften.
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PROLOGUE    13	  
Prologue 
My interest in the topic of this thesis started as a reaction to the cur-
rent tendency within both research and policy-making to focus on 
benefits and disregard harms of preventive medicine in general, and 
screening in particular. I have learned a great deal about the signifi-
cance of sound methodology and I have gained insights about the 
shortcomings of much of the evidence base on which Western medi-
cine rests. I do believe that these aspects are immensely important. 
But in the process of writing this thesis, I have become aware that 
there are problems in medical science today that are much more pro-
found than that.  
In my opinion, the presumed value neutrality of medical research 
within our scientific paradigm is hugely problematic. Because; there is 
no such thing as value neutral science. What we do in research, all the 
way from the research questions we pose, to the research methods we 
chose, to the interpretation of our results, is all value-laden. We need 
to recognise that, and not hide behind a mask of scientific neutrality.  
I believe that we as researchers should devote more attention to the 
humanistic and existential aspects of our work, and incorporate phi-
losophy and sociology in our projects, to a much larger extent than 
what we do today. In my opinion, the way forward is to be much 
more sensitive to the inherent values of our endeavour. Instead of 
aiming for value neutrality, we should explore and critically reflect on 
the inherent values of our research, and make them explicit. We 
should take a step back, and view our own ideas within the landscape 
of a wider history of ideas.
	  	  	  
 
14  
 
 
	   	  	  
 
INTRODUCTION    15 
Introduction 
Screening – historical context 
 
The rise of preventive medicine 
During the last half a century, Western medicine has evolved from 
primarily focusing on people with symptoms of disease to an in-
creased attention on preventing or finding disease in asymptomatic 
people (Sackett 2002). In this context, mass screening to detect risk 
factors and early stages of disease has gained huge popularity amongst 
policy makers, health care personnel, the media and lay people 
(Schwartz 2004, Wegwarth 2012, Chen 2013). 
To prevent people from getting sick in the first place, or to find dis-
ease early – even before symptoms, sounds intuitively appealing to 
most of us and there are many examples in medicine where this is 
fully justified. But this strategy entails specific considerations; the eth-
ical premises of preventive medicine are fundamentally different 
compared to when people seek the health care system due to symp-
toms (Sackett 2002). David Sackett, often referred to as one of the 
founders of evidence based medicine, reflected on this in a paper 
from 2002 titled “The arrogance of preventive medicine”: 
”…the 2 disciplines [”curative” and preventive medicine] 
are absolutely and fundamentally different in their obliga-
tions and implied promises to the individuals whose lives 
they modify. When patients sought me out for help with 
their established, symptomatic diseases, I promised them 
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only to do my best and never guaranteed that my interven-
tions would make them better..  ..But surely the fundamen-
tal promise we make when we actively solicit individuals 
and exhort them to accept preventive interventions must be 
that, on average, they will be the better for it. Accordingly, 
the presumption that justifies the aggressive assertiveness with 
which we go after the unsuspecting healthy must be based 
on the highest level of randomized evidence that our pre-
ventive manoeuvre will, in fact, do more good than harm.” 
He continues:  
“First, it [preventive medicine] is aggressively assertive, pur-
suing symptomless individuals and telling them what they 
must do to remain healthy.. ..Second, preventive medicine 
is presumptuous, confident that the interventions it espous-
es will, on average, do more good than harm to those who 
accept and adhere to them. Finally, preventive medicine 
is overbearing, attacking those who question the value of its 
recommendations.” 
Preventive medicine has, in only half a century, fundamentally 
changed Western medicine (Fugelli 2006, Pétursson 2012). However, 
our understanding of the meaning of diseases and diagnoses might 
not have adjusted to the new premises. 
 
A new understanding of disease progression 
Historically, our understanding of disease progression has primarily 
been based on patients with symptoms of disease (Welch 2011). But 
today, people are diagnosed with life threatening diseases while being 
free of symptoms. This development has revealed that disease pro-
gression is widely diverse and utterly complex; our previous under-
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standing of the natural history of many diseases has become chal-
lenged (Welch 2011). 
 
Non-predictable disease progression in cancer 
Previously, cancer has been understood as a phenomenon that in 
most cases will lead to death if left untreated. But today, it is probably 
more accurate to understand a diagnosis of cancer as a pathological 
description made at a single time point, with diverse and sometimes 
limited relevance for the affected individual (Welch 2010). In the fig-
ure below from Welch and colleagues, a schematic presentation of the 
different ways in which cancer can develop is presented (Welch 
2010).  
 
Figure 1. Heterogeneity of cancer progression  
Reproduced with permission from (Welch HG, Black WC. Overdiagnosis in cancer. J Natl Cancer Inst 2010;102:605-13) Copyright © 2010, 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Lethal cancer can grow fast or slow. Some cancers grow so slowly 
that they would never have caused symptoms in the remaining 
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lifespan, i.e. they are progressive, but not lethal. Additionally, some 
cancers are non-progressive and some cancers can even regress and 
disappear (Zahl 2008, Welch 2010). Paradoxically, screening tends to 
be better at finding the slow-growing or non-progressive cancers than 
the fast growing ones, because the time span for a detectable but 
asymptomatic stage is longer for these cancers (length bias) (Welch 
2010). 
That cancer progression tends to be non-predictable presents a prob-
lem in a screening context (Zahl 2008, Welch 2010). This is because it 
is not possible to know if a cancer detected at screening would even-
tually cause problems or not. From autopsy studies, it is clear that for 
many cancers, there is an asymptomatic disease reservoir, which 
would have been labelled as cancer if it had been found, but nonethe-
less did not cause symptoms before death from other cause (Welch 
2010). For some cancers, this is well-recognised and uncontroversial. 
For example, 30-70% of men above 60 years of age with no symp-
toms of prostate cancer, and who died from an unrelated cause, have 
been found to have histopathologically verified prostate cancer (Sakr 
1996, Stamatiou 2006, Damiano 2007). Another autopsy study sug-
gests that almost all adults would have a thyroid cancer if the thyroid 
gland would be thoroughly enough investigated (Harach 1985).  
There are two reasons that an asymptomatic disease reservoir exists; 
either the cancer never progress (or even regress), or the cancer pro-
gress too slow to become symptomatic before the person dies from 
another cause (Zahl 2008, Welch 2010, Zahl 2013). It is worth noting 
that even highly aggressive cancers can remain asymptomatic 
throughout the lifespan of the affected person, if the person has high 
competing risks, i.e. a high risk of dying of something else in a short 
time-span (Zahl 2013). 
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The problems that non-predictable disease progression and disease 
reservoirs entail in a screening context can be exemplified with the 
cases of thyroid cancer and neuroblastoma. 
 
Case study – thyroid cancer 
Screening for thyroid cancer was increasingly adopted in South Korea 
from the late 1990s (Ahn 2014). As displayed in the graph below 
from Ahn and colleagues, thyroid-cancer incidence increased slowly 
during the 1990s, then rapidly in the 2000s. In 2011, the rate of thy-
roid-cancer diagnoses was 15 times the rate observed in 1993.  
 
Figure 2. Thyroid-cancer incidence and related mortality in South Korea 
Reproduced with permission from (Ahn HS, Kim HJ, Welch HG. Korea’s thyroid-cancer “epidemic” – screening and overdiagnosis. N 
Engl J Med 2014;371:1765-7) Copyright Massachusetts Medical Society.  
 
Despite the dramatic increase in incidence, mortality from thyroid 
cancer has remained stable. In this time-span, there has been no im-
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provement in the treatment of thyroid cancer. Additionally, effects 
from improved treatment seems unlikely to explain this pattern, since 
such effects would have to exactly and simultaneously equal out the 
increase in incidence throughout an extensive time period. Instead, it 
is suggestive of a large rate of detection of cancers that would not 
have caused symptoms if they would have remained undetected (Ahn 
2014).  In other words; screening has been finding cancers that did 
not need to be found. Similar patterns have been observed for kidney 
cancer, prostate cancer and malignant melanoma (Welch 2011). 
 
Case study – neuroblastoma 
Neuroblastoma is an extra-cranial solid cancer that affects children. 
Screening for neuroblastoma through measuring chatecholamines in 
urine was introduced in Japan in the 1980s (Katanoda 2016). Later, 
non-randomised controlled trials revealed that mortality from neuro-
blastoma remained unchanged with screening (Schilling 2002, Woods 
2002). However, screening resulted in a marked increase in the inci-
dence of the disease. As neuroblastomas are extremely rare beyond 
adolescence, even comparatively short follow-up strongly suggested 
that screening found neuroblastomas that would later have disap-
peared by themselves if left undetected (Schilling 2002). Moreover, 
the earlier detection due to screening did not seem to have a benefi-
cial effect on those neuroblastomas that would eventually have led to 
symptoms and death (Katanoda 2016). 
 
Are the benefits from early detection of cancer exaggerated? 
The prognosis of cancer is often closely linked to the stage of the tu-
mour at diagnosis, which presents a rational to believe that early de-
tection of cancer is crucial. However, some evidence suggests that the 
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stage at diagnosis might be a consequence of the inherent biological 
aggressiveness of the tumour and not primarily a factor determined 
by the time of detection (Zahl 2008). Metastases might be formed 
very early in the tumours´ development process, for those tumours 
with a biological predisposition to do so, i.e. even before they are de-
tectable at screening (Zahl 2008). If this is true, the current emphasis 
of early detection of cancer might be exaggerated.  
 
Non-predictable disease progression in non-cancerous disease 
Much of the research in this area is based on cancer and cancer 
screening, and some of the aspects are indeed specific to cancer. 
However, most of the above reasoning applies also to screening for 
non-cancerous conditions. This is because the underlying premises 
are similar when screening asymptomatic people, no matter if the 
condition screened for is cancer or some other none-communicable 
disease or risk factor. To find an asymptomatic condition has in gen-
eral no benefit in itself; the benefit comes from avoiding the symp-
tomatic end-point. For people who would never experience the 
symptomatic end-point, a diagnosis of an asymptomatic condition is 
not beneficial in terms of disease outcomes, but can cause harm 
through unnecessary treatment and disease labelling (Welch 2011).  
For example; an abdominal aortic aneurysm is defined as an aortic 
diameter equal to or above 30 mm (Wanhainen 2011). The risk of 
rupture is very small if the aneurysm is 30 mm, but increases with in-
creased diameter of the aneurysm (Brown 2003). However, some 
small aneurysms do rupture while some large aneurysms never rup-
ture. Additionally, aneurysms grow at different rate and up to half of 
all small aneurysms hardly grow at all (Vardulaki 1998, Thompson 
2010). This means that abdominal aortic aneurysms have a non-
predictable disease progression. Furthermore, we know from autopsy 
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studies that some people die with, and not from, un-ruptured ab-
dominal aortic aneurysms (Bengtsson 1996), i.e. there is a disease res-
ervoir for this condition. The same applies to asymptomatic cases of 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Miller 2015), chronic kidney 
disease (Moynihan 2013), predementia (Le Couteur 2013), polycystic 
ovary syndrome (Copp 2017), hypertension (Martin 2014), diabetes 
type 2 (Cundy 2014, Yudkin 2014) and osteoporosis (Järvinen 2015). 
Arguably, all these asymptomatic conditions have disease reservoirs 
partly because they exist in a disease spectrum, not as either/or enti-
ties. They have non-predictable disease progressions because some 
people will suffer symptomatic consequences soon after diagnosis, 
while some will do so after an extensive time period, and further 
some would never suffer any consequences in their remaining 
lifespan even if the condition had remained undetected.  
Furthermore, the same pattern as in the graph for thyroid cancer 
above, is observed for non-cancerous conditions. For example; the 
incidence of pulmonary embolism has risen substantially and simulta-
neously with an increased usage of computer tomography, while mor-
tality has remained stable (Wiener 2013). This indicates non-
predictable disease progression and a substantial disease-reservoir for 
this condition. In other words; the increased sensitivity of computer 
tomography compared to previous diagnostic techniques makes us 
find pulmonary emboli that do not need to be found (Wiener 2013).  
Indeed, an understanding of a diagnosis as something absolute is 
questionable. Instead of primarily focusing on whether a person ful-
fils the criteria for a certain diagnosis, it is probably more relevant to 
consider whether that person is likely to gain from receiving the diag-
nosis or not.   
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Benefits and harms of screening - taxonomy 
 
The general idea behind screening is to decrease mortality and mor-
bidity through the detection and treatment of risk factors, precursors 
of disease or early stages of disease, in asymptomatic people. Howev-
er, for screening to be effective it must not only detect disease at an 
earlier stage, but the early detection must also lead to improved prog-
nosis, i.e. a lower incidence of late-stage, symptomatic disease and/or 
death (Welch 2011). Furthermore, if screening detects “disease” that 
would never have progressed to cause symptoms, the benefits of early 
detection might be outweighed by harms of overdetection of harm-
less conditions, and subsequent unnecessary medical interventions 
(Welch 2011, Harris 2014). 
 
The screening cascade 
In order to think systematically about benefits and harms of screen-
ing, it is helpful to follow the steps in the screening cascade, shown 
on the next page in a figure from Harris and colleagues (on which the 
following section is based) (Harris 2014).  
	  	  	  
 
24  
 
 
Figure 3. The screening cascade 
From Annals of Internal Medicine, Harris RP, Sheridan SL, Lewis CL, Barclay C, Vu MB, Kistler CE, Golin CE, DeFrank JT, Brewer NT. The 
harms of screening: a proposed taxonomy and application to lung cancer screening. JAMA Intern Med 2014;174:281–5. American College of 
Physicians. All Rights Reserved. Reprinted with the permission of American College of Physicians, Inc. 
 
True negative results 
People who are screened can have a negative or a positive result of 
the screening test. For those with a negative result, this may be either 
true or false (not shown in Figure above). For those with a true nega-
tive result, screening might offer reassurance, which can constitute a 
benefit from screening. However, it could also be questioned if such 
reassurance is beneficial in the long run, since it might create a need 
for recurrent reassurance and thus repeated medical investigations 
(Brodersen 2011). It may also lead to reluctance to seek medical at-
tention for symptoms of a disease that arise after the screen (and thus 
poorer outcomes) (Goldenberg 2016). 
 
 
The Screening Cascade 
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False negative results 
For those with a false negative result (i.e. those who have a disease 
that the screening test do not find), screening might be harmful be-
cause having a negative screening test might reassure both the patient 
and health care personnel and the diagnosis thus might be delayed 
(Goldenberg 2016). 
 
False positive results 
Having a false positive result means that the initial screening test is 
positive, but further work-up reveal that the initial finding was a false 
alarm (Harris 2014). This could be exemplified with a suspicious find-
ing on mammography screening, which after ultrasound and biopsies 
is diagnosed as a benign tumour. Previously, false positive findings 
have been considered rather harmless, especially when the final diag-
nosis is derived within a short timeframe. However, in a large ques-
tionnaire study, women with false positive results on mammography 
screening reported greater negative psychosocial consequences, com-
pared to women with normal findings, still three years after being de-
clared free of cancer (Brodersen 2013). 
 
True positive results 
Having a true positive result means having a positive finding on the 
screening test and actually having the condition. The diagnosis is 
most often confirmed only after further work-up, for example 
through histopathological investigation of a biopsy from a suspected 
lesion found at radiological investigation. People with true positive 
findings belong to one out of four categories, as displayed in the 
graph above (Harris 2014);  
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1. those for whom the earlier diagnosis improve prognosis, 
2. those who would die of the disease at the same time with or 
without screening,  
3. those for whom if the disease would have been detected first 
when it gave symptoms (i.e. without screening) it would still 
have been treatable with the same treatment and the patient 
would have survived the disease anyway,  
4. those who would never have had any symptoms of the dis-
ease if it had not been detected through screening, i.e. they are 
overdiagnosed. 
 
For people in category one, the early detection through screening is 
beneficial (Harris 2014). They can either avoid death of the condition 
screened for. This can be exemplified with a woman who has a non-
metastatic screen-detected melanoma of the skin extirpated and that 
melanoma would otherwise not have been detected before metasta-
ses, which would have led to death. Or the early detection through 
screening can result in less aggressive treatment, which constitutes a 
benefit in itself (Harris 2014). This can be exemplified with a man 
who through preventive surgery of a screen-detected abdominal aor-
tic aneurysm avoids a rupture of the aneurysm, which he would have 
survived also without screening. Since acute surgery for a ruptured 
aneurysm has a much higher complication rate than elective surgery, 
screening is likely beneficial for this man, although he would have 
survived also without screening.  
For people in categories two and three, screening is not beneficial. 
Instead, screening results in living longer with a diagnosis without 
having ones life extended. This is considered a harm of screening 
since living with a history of a potentially life threatening disease can 
impact quality of life (Harris 2014). This can be exemplified by a man 
who gets an abdominal aortic aneurysm detected at screening at the 
age of 65. The aneurysm is small and grows slowly, and when the an-
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eurysm is large enough for surgery to be considered at age 87, he is 
too old to be eligible for the operation. He dies from a ruptured an-
eurysm at the age of 89. For him, screening resulted in unnecessarily 
living with the knowledge of having an abdominal aortic aneurysm 
for 24 years, without any benefit.  
People in category four are overdiagnosed. For them, screening re-
sults in harm through psychological consequences of being labelled 
with a diagnosis, and subsequent medical interventions, which per 
definition are unnecessary since the condition would never have 
caused symptoms (Harris 2014). Overdiagnosis was for long a con-
troversial concept but is increasingly accepted as an important harm 
of screening (Welch 2011, Barratt 2015), although the magnitude of 
overdiagnosis caused by screening is still a topic of intense debate 
(Biesheuvel 2007). Overdiagnosis can be exemplified with a woman 
who, at the age of 62, is diagnosed with breast cancer at screening. 
She has surgery, and perhaps chemotherapy and radiation, for this 
breast cancer. She dies at the age of 85 of a heart attack, which she 
would have even if the breast cancer had never been detected, since 
this cancer would never have progressed to cause symptoms. Conse-
quently, she was unnecessarily labelled with a diagnosis of breast can-
cer, and she unnecessarily received treatment for this cancer.  
For screening programmes whose primary effect is finding and treat-
ing precursors of disease and through this lower overall disease inci-
dence, overdiagnosis of the late-stage disease is generally not a 
substantial problem (Bretthauer 2013). In these cases, overdiagnosis 
and overtreatment of the precursor may be a bigger problem. For ex-
ample; in cervical cancer screening, overdiagnosis of cervical cancer is 
probably limited, while overtreatment of dysplasia that would never 
have progressed to cause symptoms may be considerable (Moyer 
2012). 
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Incidental findings 
For incidental findings, the screening cascade starts over again, i.e. the 
incidental finding could be a false positive or a true positive. People 
with true positive findings could either benefit from the early diagno-
sis, they could be “correctly” diagnosed but nevertheless not benefit 
from the early diagnosis, and they could be overdiagnosed (Harris 
2014). 
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Estimating benefits and harms of screening 
 
For a screening programme to be worthwhile, it must not only have 
benefits, but the benefits must outweigh the harms. To be able to 
judge whether this is fulfilled or not, a prerequisite is that both harms 
and benefits are adequately explored, quantified and their conse-
quences sufficiently investigated. To cover research methods for 
evaluation of all harms and benefits of screening is outside the scope 
of this thesis. I will now discuss methodological aspects related to 
estimating the effect of screening on mortality, overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment. I will briefly touch upon methods to estimate psycho-
social consequences of screening. 
 
Evidence from randomised versus non-randomised studies 
Before considering implementation of population-based screening in 
asymptomatic citizens, high-quality evidence from randomised trials 
showing a mortality benefit is a general requirement from official 
bodies like for example the World Health Organisation (Andermann 
2008, UKNSC 2015). This is a legitimate requirement for many rea-
sons. Firstly, beneficial effects of screening are small on the popula-
tion level, and small effects require very high quality evidence to be 
revealed with confidence (Prasad 2016). Secondly, non-randomised 
studies of the effects of interventions on mortality have an inherently 
high risk of bias and can lead to seriously misleading results (Higgins 
2011). Thirdly, screening always has harms, why there must be a high 
certainty of a benefit that may potentially outweigh these harms (Har-
ris 2014). Fourthly, screening programmes has a high potential for 
opportunity costs (Harris 2014). Fifthly, when offering screening, 
health care systems invite asymptomatic people to an intervention 
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that they have not asked for, which leads to ethical considerations 
that differ from those in regular health care (Sackett 2002). 
Consequently, evidence of a mortality benefit should, in general, 
come from well-conducted randomised trials before implementation 
of screening could come in question. Furthermore, the gold standard 
for estimating overdiagnosis and overtreatment is a high quality ran-
domised trial with life-long follow-up, where the control group has 
never been screened (Carter 2015). However, some screening pro-
grammes have been implemented without evidence from randomised 
trials. As the introduction of screening in a population generally pre-
cludes additional randomised trials, evidence from non-randomised 
studies is usually needed in these cases. Furthermore, non-
randomised studies are generally needed for continuous reassessment 
of existing screening programmes. Such reassessment is important 
because the premises of screening programmes can change after its 
introduction (Carter 2015). For example; the incidence of the disease 
can decrease or increase, the screening test can become more sensi-
tive or the treatment of the disease can improve. Perhaps counter-
intuitive, this last aspect may result in screening being less beneficial, 
since treatment might become equally effective for people with 
screen-detected disease as for those diagnosed later due to symptoms, 
making screening obsolete.  
Consequently, we sometimes need to turn to non-randomised studies, 
such as cohort studies, for estimating the effect of screening on mor-
tality as well as on overdiagnosis and overtreatment. A central prob-
lem in cohort studies is the risk of confounding, i.e. the difficulty of 
separating an effect of screening from an effect of other factors 
(Carter 2015). The choice of “control group” is crucial. The “control 
group” can consist either of historical cohorts (i.e. comparing trends 
before and after screening), of age groups not invited to screening 
(i.e. younger or older than those invited to screening) or of contem-
poraneous same-age cohorts not invited to screening (for example a 
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geographical region where screening has not been introduced) 
(Biesheuvel 2007, Carter 2015, Lee 2017). The last alternative is usual-
ly preferable since factors like time trends in mortality and incidence, 
and different trends in different age groups, do not affect such esti-
mates. However, a situation that allows this require differential intro-
duction of screening in various regions over a long time-frame, a 
condition that is only rarely met. Additionally, there is still a risk of 
confounding due to other factors such as differences in socioeco-
nomic status between screened and non-screened groups that live in 
different geographical areas. Noteworthy, it is important not to use 
non-attenders as a control group, since non-attenders generally have a 
much higher overall risk of dying compared to attenders to screening, 
regardless of the effects of screening. In other words; attendance to 
screening is associated with a better health in general, a well-known 
phenomena called “the healthy screenee effect” (Raffle 2007). There-
fore, such estimates will be biased in favour of screening. 
In conclusion, evidence from non-randomised studies is needed to 
monitor the effect of existing screening programmes, which may have 
changed substantially since the trials that motivated them. But such 
studies have several methodological pitfalls, which should be carefully 
considered. 
 
Estimating a mortality benefit 
Disease-specific versus total mortality 
Disease-specific mortality in cancer screening trials is an outcome 
prone to bias from misclassification of the cause of death (Prasad 
2016). Knowledge of the diagnosis increases the risk that the cause of 
death is falsely attributed to the disease in question (sticky-diagnosis 
bias) (Black 2002). Since, in general, more people in the screening 
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group are diagnosed with the condition compared to the control 
group, this bias will underestimate the effect of screening. Conversely, 
a death can be falsely attributed to another cause, usually because 
some time has elapsed since diagnosis or because the connection is 
not always clear-cut (slippery-linkage bias) (Black 2002). For example, 
a death due to renal failure arising after surgery for a screen-detected 
abdominal aortic aneurysm might not be attributed to screening, and 
likewise for a suicide due to psychological harms following the diag-
nosis of a screen-detected prostate cancer. Total mortality is free 
from these biases and is therefore the most reliable outcome when 
evaluating an effect of a screening programme (Prasad 2016). The 
downside of total mortality as an outcome is that large populations 
are needed in the trials to reliably detect a difference, especially when 
the effect is small in absolute numbers. As of now, no screening in-
tervention has a documented effect on total mortality despite some-
times hundreds of thousands of randomised individuals (Prasad 
2016). 
 
Why survival rates are misleading 
A common way of presenting the effect of screening is through sur-
vival-rates, i.e. the proportion of people diagnosed with the condition 
who is still alive X years after being diagnosed, in screened versus 
non-screened populations (Wegwarth 2012). Since the whole point 
with screening is to advance the diagnosis, survival rates will inevita-
bly be improved for the screening group even if screening does not 
result in any survival benefit, i.e. even if all people affected by the 
condition die at the exact same time with or without screening (lead 
time bias). Additionally, in screening interventions with overdiagnosis 
survival rates in the screened group will be inflated, since overdiag-
nosed people per definition will not die from the condition. This 
leads to that screening appear more beneficial than it is (Wegwarth 
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2012). For example, in the case of neuroblastoma (referred to previ-
ously in this Introduction), screening increased survival rates from 
17% to 72% (Sawada 1982), even though screening had no effect on 
mortality from neuroblastoma (Schilling 2002, Woods 2002). Conse-
quently, survival rates are inherently biased and thus misleading in a 
screening context. They should not be used to compare screened ver-
sus non-screened groups (Wegwarth 2012). 
 
Estimating overdiagnosis 
Overdiagnosis results in harm in two ways; through psychosocial 
consequences of being labelled with a diagnosis, and through subse-
quent medical investigations and treatments (Welch 2010, Welch 
2011, Harris 2014, Barratt 2015, Carter 2015). These are per defini-
tion unnecessary since the condition would never have caused symp-
toms. It is not possible to know who is overdiagnosed on an 
individual level, but it is possible to estimate the rate of overdiagnosis 
caused by screening at the population level (Carter 2015).  
It is important to realise that there is no single “correct” estimate of 
overdiagnosis for a given type of screening (Carter 2015). The level of 
overdiagnosis will change over time due to, for example, develop-
ments in underlying incidence rates and more sensitive screening 
technologies. There will also be differences between settings due to 
differences in diagnostic standards and practises. Any estimate of 
overdiagnosis is therefore a snapshot in time for a given context.  
To conceptualise how overdiagnosis can be estimated, one could im-
agine a randomised trial with lifelong follow-up where people are 
randomised to screening or no screening. Typically, the incidence of 
the condition screened for will initially increase in the screening group 
compared to the control group. In the absence of overdiagnosis, this 
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initial increase will eventually be fully compensated for by a similar 
decrease in incidence in older age groups. Overdiagnosis due to 
screening is the absolute difference in the number of diagnoses de-
tected during the lifetime of the two groups, provided the control 
group is not screened (Biesheuvel 2007, Zahl 2013). 
 
Methods for estimating overdiagnosis 
The best method to estimate overdiagnosis caused by screening is a 
topic of intense debate within the research community (Biesheuvel 
2007, Zahl 2013, Lee 2017). Biesheuveul and colleagues summarise 
the different methods in a paper, which most of the following exposi-
tion is based on (Biesheuvel 2007). In summary, there are mainly two 
different ways of estimating overdiagnosis; the excess incidence ap-
proach (including the incidence-rate-method and the cumulative-
incidence method) and modelling approaches (Biesheuvel 2007) (also 
called lead time approaches) (Etzioni 2015). Central to understanding 
the different methods is the concept of lead time. Lead time is the 
time by which screening advances the diagnosis, that is the time be-
tween detection at screening and the time when the condition would 
have presented itself clinically in the absence of screening.  
There may not be one single “best method” to estimate overdiagnosis 
(Carter 2015, Etzioni 2015). This will certainly depend on the dataset 
available in a given setting (for example; is there a contemporary non-
screened “control group” available or not). Indeed, as no method is 
perfect, the best approach may be to apply more than one method, 
each having its own strengths and weaknesses and using these to “tri-
angulate” an estimate (Etzioni 2015). 
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The excess incidence method 
In the excess incidence method, incidence is compared between a 
screened and an unscreened group (average annual incidence in the 
incidence-rate-method and cumulative incidence in the cumulative-
incidence method) (Biesheuvel 2007).  
The incidence-rate method can be used in screening programmes 
where screening is performed repeatedly during an extended time pe-
riod, like for example in breast cancer screening (Biesheuvel 2007). 
With the incidence-rate method, the annual incidence rate is com-
pared between a screened and an unscreened group once a screening 
programme is well established. This means that, in addition to ad-
justments for lead time for incident cases, lead time is accounted for 
by excluding the early screening rounds. Excluding the initial screen-
ing rounds will however also exclude prevalent conditions that were 
never destined to become symptomatic, and this approach will there-
by underestimate overdiagnosis (Biesheuvel 2007).  
With the cumulative incidence method, the cumulative incidence 
of the condition screened for is compared between a screened and an 
unscreened group of people over the same time period (Biesheuvel 
2007). Because lead time results in a drop in incidence after screening 
stops, the estimate should be performed first after screening stops 
plus the length of the maximal lead time (which is a topic of scientific 
controversy, see below). If there is no overdiagnosis due to screening, 
the cumulative incidence will be the same in the two groups after this 
time of follow-up. If there is overdiagnosis due to screening, there 
will be an excess of cases in the screened group compared with the 
unscreened group. Since this method includes the early screening 
rounds, it has been argued that it is more robust than the incidence 
rate method (Biesheuvel 2007). 
The major criticism of studies using the cumulative incidence method 
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includes; that follow-up after screening stops is often too short 
(which will result in over-estimates of overdiagnosis), that continued 
screening in the screening group after screening stops is often unac-
counted for (which will also overestimate overdiagnosis), and that 
estimates of counterfactual incidence (i.e. estimating what the inci-
dence would have been without screening) are susceptible to consid-
erable uncertainty in non-randomised studies, with potentially 
substantial impact on the estimates of overdiagnosis (Etzioni 2015, 
Lee 2017). 
 
The modelling approach (also called the lead time approach) 
While the excess incidence approach estimates overdiagnosis based 
on observed data, modelling approaches are based on modelling of 
disease transition (Biesheuvel 2007, Carter 2015). In this approach, 
estimates of overdiagnosis are based on a “competition” between 
death from other causes and lead time (i.e. overdiagnosis arises if the 
time of death comes before the time point at which the diagnosis 
would have presented itself clinically without screening). Central in 
this approach is therefore the estimate of lead time. The major criti-
cism to modelling approaches is that they require assumptions, which 
are subjective and difficult, or even impossible, to verify. Further-
more, the models are also accused of a lack of transparency, i.e. it is 
difficult to check how the estimates have been derived (Biesheuvel 
2007, Carter 2015). The pros of modelling approaches are that esti-
mates of overdiagnosis can be derived even if empirical data from 
randomised trials or natural cohorts is lacking (Etzioni 2015, Lee 
2017).  
 
 
	   	  	  
 
INTRODUCTION    37 
The dispute about lead time  
There is scientific controversy about appropriate methods to estimate 
lead time, i.e. the length of time that diagnosis is advanced by screen-
ing (Zahl 2013, Etzioni 2015, Lee 2017). Zahl and colleagues argue 
that a fundamental problem with most estimates of lead time is that 
they do not take overdiagnosis into account. Since overdiagnosed 
cases per definition have an infinite lead time, this will result in over-
estimates of lead time for the clinically relevant cases (Zahl 2013). An 
overestimated lead time for clinically relevant cases results in over-
compensation, which in turn leads to underestimates of overdiagnosis 
(both for modelling approaches and for excess incidence approaches). 
 
Which denominator to use 
When estimating the relative rate of overdiagnosis, the denominator 
could be either the conditions detected during the screening period, 
or the total number of conditions detected during the lifetime of the 
screening and control groups (Biesheuvel 2007). The first approach 
provides an estimate of the proportion of conditions that are overdi-
agnosed during screening, while the second approach estimates the 
life-time risk of being overdiagnosed due to screening. The second 
approach will lead to lower percentage estimates of overdiganosis 
(absolute estimates of overdiganosed cases are not dependent on a 
denominator). This is because the second approach is susceptible to 
dilution effect from new diagnoses that appear in both groups after 
screening. The first approach is arguably a more relevant measure, at 
least from the perspective of the individual deciding on whether to 
attend to screening or not (Biesheuvel 2007, Zahl 2013).  
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Estimating overtreatment 
When estimating overtreatment, much of the same principles men-
tioned above for overdiagnosis apply. But instead of incidence (i.e. 
diagnoses), the rate of treatment is analysed. Treatment could consti-
tute pharmacological interventions, surgery or virtually any other 
medical treatment. Naturally, there are special considerations depend-
ing on the context. 
 
Test accuracy of the screening test 
The test accuracy of a screening test is important when considering 
the benefits and harms of screening; a low sensitivity will result in a 
high rate of false negative results, while a low specificity will result in 
a high rate of false positive results – both affecting the benefit-to-
harm balance of screening. However, even if the test accuracy of a 
screening test is good, it does not necessarily mean that this can be 
translated into a beneficial effect in patient relevant outcomes, i.e. 
that the screening test is good at finding the disease screened for does 
not necessarily mean that finding the disease through screening will 
improve prognosis (Hakama 2007, Hakama 2015). Further, measures 
of test accuracy do not normally take overdiagnosis into account, 
which means that in theory both sensitivity and specificity could be 
deceptively high even if most screen-detected conditions would con-
stitute overdiagnosis (Hakama 2007, Hakama 2015). In conclusion, 
measures of screening and diagnostic test accuracy such as sensitivity 
and specificity could be seen as surrogate outcomes, which cannot 
necessarily be translated into patient relevant outcomes. An exposi-
tion of further aspects related to diagnostic test accuracy of the 
screening test is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Psychosocial consequences of screening 
The concept of separating physical and psychosocial consequences of 
screening exposes a body-mind dualism inherent in our scientific par-
adigm (Kirkengen 2016). Can the consequences of going through 
massive surgery (with risks of major complications and even death) 
be separated into effects in our bodies and effects in our minds? Can 
the existential uncertainty following a diagnosis of a life threatening 
condition be defined as solely psychological in nature? Emerging evi-
dence questions this dualistic perspective, and suggests that mind and 
body are not only two entities affecting each other, but so intertwined 
that they are basically one and the same (Kirkengen 2016). However, 
for reasons of simplicity, I here chose to adhere to the prevailing tax-
onomy of psyche and soma.  
Shortage of evidence on psychosocial consequences of screening is 
common; a review found this for all screening modalities investigated: 
abdominal aortic aneurysm, prostate cancer, lung cancer, osteoporosis 
and carotid artery stenosis (DeFrank 2015). Most of the quantitative 
studies on psychosocial consequences of screening use generic (as 
opposed to diagnosis-specific) questionnaires (DeFrank 2015). Ex-
amples of generic questionnaires are SF-36, ScreenQL, EQ-5F and 
HAD. Generic questionnaires have a low validity in a screening con-
text because they do not capture central aspects specific to the 
screened condition (McCaffery 2004, Brodersen 2007), for example 
anxiety about rupture during sexual activity for people with screen-
detected abdominal aortic aneurysms. Also, aspects not important for 
this specific group can contaminate the results. The use of generic 
instruments is therefore questioned in a screening context (McCaffery 
2004, Brodersen 2007). Additionally, the psychometric properties of 
the used questionnaires in studies of psychosocial consequences of 
screening are often not reported, which arguably signals a low quality 
of these studies (Brodersen 2007). However, methodological aspects 
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of estimating psychosocial consequences of screening are outside the 
scope of this thesis. Noteworthy, some aspects of being labelled with 
a diagnosis are not easily captured through quantitative approaches, 
why it is problematic that qualitative research is generally considered 
less important than evidence from quantitative approaches in evi-
dence synthesis and policy making (Greenhalgh 2015).  
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Beyond benefits and harms 
 
Costs, feasibility and equity 
For a screening programme to be worthwhile, it must not only have 
an acceptable benefit-to-harm balance. It must also be cost-effective 
and feasible (Andermann 2008). Additionally, aspects of equity 
should be considered, as well as opportunity costs (Andermann 
2008). An in-depth analysis of these factors is outside the scope of 
this thesis, why I will only briefly consider some of the related as-
pects.  
In most screening programmes, attendance displays a social gradient 
(Weiss 1996, Raffle 2007), which means that a higher proportion of 
people with high economic status attend to screening compared to 
people with low socioeconomic status. In this way, screening pro-
grammes often contribute to inequity in health care. Ironically, for 
most conditions screened for, people with low socioeconomic status 
have a higher risk of dying from the condition compared to people 
with high socioeconomic status (Weiss 1996, Raffle 2007).  
Most cost-effectiveness analyses of screening does not adequately in-
clude costs from important harms, which make them misleading. Ad-
ditionally, screening programmes for asymptomatic conditions might 
influence the general perception of disease and health in a society; our 
ability to trust our own bodies might be affected by being diagnosed 
with disease while being free of symptoms (Reventlow 2006, Sångren 
2009, Harris 2014). In extension, this might affect search patterns for 
health care services and would in that case have economical effects 
outside of the screening cascade. Furthermore, screening results in 
opportunity costs (Harris 2014). This means that resources are spent 
on screening that could have been spent on other medical interven-
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tions, or in other societal sectors.  
 
The ethics of screening 
Screening will always cause harm to some people, even when result-
ing in substantial benefit for other people (Shickle 1994, Harris 2014). 
There is no scientifically correct answer to whether this is ethically 
acceptable. From a utilitarian perspective, screening is justifiable if it 
results in net benefit (Shickle 1994, Kelly 2015). However, science 
cannot provide an answer on what constitutes a net benefit; this is a 
value judgement (Harris 2015, Kelly 2015, Carter 2017). Moreover, 
strict utilitarianism is hardly acceptable in Western medicine, we must 
also consider overarching deontological principles, such as the general 
requirement for the medical profession of not causing harm (primum 
non nocere), especially when inviting asymptomatic citizens to an in-
tervention they have not asked for (Shickle 1994). 
As more attention is given to the harms of screening, it is increasingly 
argued that the solution to the ethical dilemmas presented by screen-
ing is to ensure “free and informed decisions of those who are invited 
to screening” (Brownsword 2010), which correlates to an increased 
focus on informed choice and shared decision making in health care 
at large (Hoffmann 2014). But many screening programmes do not 
provide information about harms in invitations (Jørgensen 2009, 
Gøtzsche 2011, Kolthoff 2016), which overrides the autonomy of the 
individual. Further, a scarcity of reliable information about the harms 
of screening in general means informed decisions without adequate 
access to the facts. 
 
 
 
	   	  	  
 
INTRODUCTION    43 
When is a screening programme worthwhile?  
In conclusion, a prerequisite for being able to judge if a screening 
programme is worthwhile is that both benefits and harms are ade-
quately investigated and that aspects of costs, feasibility, equity and 
ethics have been carefully considered. However, there is no scientifi-
cally “correct” way of judging whether a screening programme is 
worthwhile or not (Harris 2015, Carter 2017). There is no common 
unit of measurement for benefits and harms of screening why the 
balance will always be a subjective judgement, which no one has ex-
clusive privilege to assess. Therefore, when authorities decide if a 
screening programme should be implemented or not, or if an existing 
screening programme should be deimplemented or continued, the 
process should be transparent and the inherent value judgements 
should be made explicit (Barratt 2017, Carter 2017). 
I will discuss themes related to opportunity costs, equity and the eth-
ics of screening in more depth in the General Discussion of this the-
sis. 
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Screening for Malignant Melanoma 
 
Malignant melanoma is a tumour of the skin, which can cause death 
through metastases to other organs. The most important avoidable 
risk factor is irregular over-exposure to ultraviolet radiation from sun-
light and artificial sources (Gandini 2005). Other risk factors include 
blonde or red hair, green or blue eyes, freckles, an inability to tan, a 
family history of malignant melanoma, and a large number of naevi 
and dysplastic naevi (Marks 2000).  
Screening for malignant melanoma has the potential to reduce mor-
tality from the disease through earlier detection, as prognosis is close-
ly associated with the thickness of the lesion at the time of diagnosis, 
with thinner lesions having a much lower risk of metastases (Breslow 
1970). Screening for malignant melanoma can be performed through 
visual self-examination of the skin or visual inspection by a general 
practitioner, dermatologist, or other health professional, which can be 
followed by dermatoscopy of identified lesions. Other methods to 
assist in diagnosing malignant melanomas are evolving and might also 
be used for screening, for example, teledermatology, mobile phone 
applications, and spectroscopy-based techniques (Dinnes 2015).  
The incidence of malignant melanoma in Western populations has 
risen many-fold over recent decades (Garbe 2009). This might be due 
in part to an increase in exposure to risk factors, mainly ultraviolet 
radiation from the sun and artificial sources (Waldmann 2012). How-
ever, it is also likely that some of the rise in incidence is caused by 
overdiagnosis of indolent malignant melanomas through increased 
disease awareness and screening. As displayed in the graph below 
from Welch and colleagues, the large increase in incidence has not 
been followed by an increase in mortality (Welch 2005). As described 
previously, such patterns are unlikely to be explained by improve-
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ments in treatment (for example an increased rate of extirpations in 
the case of melanoma), since such effects would have to simultane-
ously and exactly equal out the increase in incidence throughout an 
extended time period. Instead, the observed pattern is suggestive of a 
large rate of detection of melanomas that do not need to be found, 
i.e. overdiagnosis (Welch 2011). 
 
Figure 4. Incidence and mortality from malignant melanoma in a United States 
population aged 65 and older, 1986-2001. Early stage refers to in situ and local dise-
ase; late stage refers to regional and distant disease. 
Reproduced with permission from (Welch HG, Woloshin S, Schwartz LM. Skin biopsy rates and incidence of melanoma – population 
based ecological study. BMJ 2005;331:481) Copyright © 2005, British Medical Journal Publishing Group. 
 
Screening for malignant melanoma is not recommended in the United 
States (Wernli 2016), Canada (CTFPHC 2013), Australia, or New 
Zealand (ACNMGRWP 2008). Germany has had a national screening 
programme for malignant melanoma since 2008 (Katalinic 2015) and 
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opportunistic screening is increasingly used in many Western coun-
tries (Lakhani 2014). In Australia, the annual skin screening rate range 
from 10% to 50% of the adult population depending on how skin 
screening is defined (Girgis 1991, Balanda 1994, Heywood 1994, Bor-
land 1995, Janda 2004), and the corresponding rate in the US is 14% 
to 20% (Federman 1997, Ford 2004, Sarayia 2004, Federman 2006). 
Several professional societies, who may have inherent vested inter-
ests, recommend skin screening (Jørgensen 2017). In Europe, a cam-
paign involving dermatologists in over 30 countries 
(EUROMELANOMA) recommends "visiting your dermatologist regularly 
for a skin check-up" and conducting self-examination every month 
(EADO 2016). In the US, the American Cancer Society recommends 
a skin self-exam every month (American Cancer Society 2017) and 
the American Academy of Dermatology runs a skin screening pro-
gramme wherein over 2.5 million skin screens have been conducted 
since 1985 (AAD 2017). 
Consequently, screening for malignant melanoma is currently prac-
tised in many countries, apparently without support from randomised 
trials. This is problematic since screening for malignant melanoma 
likely causes overdiagnosis of harmless malignant melanomas and 
subsequent overtreatment (Welch 2005, Norgaard 2011). In addition, 
screening for malignant melanoma has a high potential for opportuni-
ty costs. In conclusion, it is essential to evaluate the evidence base for 
benefits and harms of screening for malignant melanoma. 
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Screening for Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm 
 
Abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA) is a widening of the abdominal 
aorta and is defined as an aortic diameter equal to or above 30 mm 
(Wanhainen 2011). AAAs are usually asymptomatic until they rupture, 
which is fatal in more than 80% of cases (Basnyat 1999). Risk factors 
for developing AAA are smoking, male sex, advanced age, and family 
history of AAA (Guirguis-Blake 2014). The risk of rupture is correlat-
ed to the size of the aneurysm (Brown 2003). According to guidelines, 
men with aneurysms of 30 to 54 mm are offered regular ultrasound 
surveillance for the rest of their lives. If the aneurysm is equal to or 
above 55 mm or grows more than 10 mm annually, elective surgery is 
considered (Cosford 2007). Screening aims to detect the aneurysm 
before it ruptures, enabling elective surgery and hence reducing mor-
bidity and mortality from rupture. 
Elective surgery for AAA is associated with a risk of mortality and 
serious complications such as impotence, myocardial infarction, 
stroke, amputation, respiratory failure, renal failure, ischaemic colitis, 
spinal cord ischaemia and prosthetic graft infections (Calonge 2005, 
Pettersson 2009, Linné 2014). A systematic review concluded that 30-
day mortality for open repair was 4.7% (Stather 2013). Endovascular 
techniques reduce 30-day mortality, and the same systematic review 
reported a mortality rate of 1.3% for endovascular repair. However, 
endovascular techniques have more long-term complications and 
mortality is similar to that for open surgery after two years (Stather 
2013). Mortality rates may have been lowered by improvements in 
operative techniques since the studies included in the above-
mentioned systematic review. Screen-detected AAAs may have a low-
er perioperative risk. However, studies have not been able to confirm 
this (Guirguis Blake 2014, Linné 2014) and one of few studies on the 
topic found that 44% of all screen-detected AAAs operated on was 
	  	  	  
 
48  
 
defined as “complex” from a surgical perspective, which is compara-
ble to the rate amongst incidentally detected AAAs (Ohlsson 2016). 
The psychosocial consequences of living with an AAA under surveil-
lance are poorly investigated (Guirguis Blake 2014, DeFrank 2015). 
Qualitative studies indicate important problems and living with the 
knowledge of having an AAA has been described as living with a 
“ticking bomb inside your stomach” (Hansson 2012). However, re-
sults from qualitative studies do not address the magnitude of these 
problems. The available quantitative studies all use generic (as op-
posed to diagnosis-specific) questionnaires (DeFrank 2015), which 
have a low validity in a screening context because they do not capture 
central aspects (for example fear of having sex because of fear of rup-
ture) and since aspects that are not related to screening contaminate 
the results (McCaffery 2004, Brodersen 2007, DeFrank 2015). Addi-
tionally, none of the quantitative studies on the psychosocial conse-
quences of living with the knowledge of having an AAA report on 
the statistical psychometric properties of the used questionnaires, 
which arguable signals a low quality. 
Population level screening for AAA was introduced in Sweden (Wan-
hainen 2011), the United States (Guirguis-Blake 2014), and the Unit-
ed Kingdom (Davis 2013) during the 2000s. In Sweden and the UK, 
all men aged 65 are offered screening with a one-off ultrasound ex-
amination (Wanhainen 2011, Davis 2013). In the US, screening is 
recommended for men aged 65 to 75 who have ever smoked (Guir-
guis-Blake 2014).  
The decision to implement screening was based on four randomised 
trials performed in the 1980s and 1990s. These trials were included in 
a systematic review from the US Preventive Services Task Force 
(USPSTF) from 2014, which concluded that AAA screening results in 
about 50% relative reduction in AAA-related mortality (Guirguis-
Blake 2014), which translates into a 0.5 percentage point disease spe-
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cific absolute mortality reduction. However, since the USPSTF review 
the long-term follow-up of one of the trials have been published and 
showed no beneficial effect (McCaul 2016). Consequently, the ran-
domised trials collectively display great heterogeneity in their effect 
estimates, from a large beneficial effect in relative numbers in two 
trials (Lindholt 2006, Thompson 2012), to no effect in two trials 
(Ashton 2007, McCaul 2016).  
Furthermore, these estimates were based on populations with a much 
higher disease incidence than today; in the UK, the incidence of AAA 
amongst 65-year old men has fallen by over 70% during the last dec-
ades (Choke 2012, Darwood 2012). Similar trends have been ob-
served in Sweden (Svensjö 2011). This is likely caused by reduced 
smoking; in 1974, 45% of the population in the UK were smoking 
compared to 20% in 2012 (Office for national statistics 2012). A re-
duced incidence of the condition screened for results in reduced ab-
solute benefit and possibly a less favourable benefit-to-harm balance.  
To lower the threshold for the diagnosis of an AAA from 30 to 25 
mm is advocated for in the scientific community (Svensjö 2011, Dar-
wood 2012, Thompson 2012) and this has been partly adopted in the 
Swedish screening programme, which could further alter the balance 
of benefits and harms of AAA screening. 
There is limited evidence on AAA screening for women (Cosford 
2007, Guirguis-Blake 2014). Women have a much lower AAA inci-
dence than men (Svensjö 2013) and women generally die of AAA at a 
higher age than men (Vänni 2016). A lower incidence of the condi-
tion screened for results in less benefit in absolute numbers. Addi-
tionally, a shorter expected remaining lifespan results in less life years 
gained from screening. Furthermore, surgery for AAA has a higher 
mortality rate in older age groups, as well as in women compared to 
men for all age groups (Ulug 2017), why the harms of screening might 
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be higher in women. Consequently, the benefit-to-harm balance from 
screening women for AAA is likely to be worse than for men. 
Before the start of the studies included in this thesis, there were al-
ready systematic reviews on AAA screening from Cochrane (Cosford 
2007) and from the USPSTF (Guirguis-Blake 2014). However, nei-
ther of these included estimates of overdiagnosis caused by AAA 
screening, nor analyses of the effect of a lowered threshold for an 
AAA-diagnosis on the rate of overdiagnosis. Before the studies in-
cluded in this thesis there were, to our knowledge, no published esti-
mates of the rate of overdiagnosis caused by AAA screening.  
Furthermore, due to the radical drop in AAA-incidence the random-
ised trials of AAA screening are out-dated, which means that the ben-
efits and harms of AAA screening in contemporary populations are 
unknown.  
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Aims 
The general aim of this thesis was to explore how benefits and harms 
of screening for non-communicable, potentially life-threatening dis-
ease can be evaluated, with a focus on challenges when up-to-date 
data from randomised trials is lacking.  
Papers I and II 
• To assess the benefits and harms of screening for malignant 
melanoma in the general population in a systematic Cochrane 
review of randomised trials. 
Paper III 
• To assess the evidence base for harms of screening for ab-
dominal aortic aneurysm. 
• To estimate the rate of overdiagnosis and overtreatment 
caused by screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm based on 
available data from previous studies. 
• To estimate the effects of a lowered threshold of the diagno-
sis of an abdominal aortic aneurysm on the rate of overdiag-
nosis caused by screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm. 
Paper IV 
• To estimate the effect of organised screening for abdominal 
aortic aneurysm in Sweden, in a population with low disease-
incidence compared to the randomised trials that led to the 
introduction of screening, on overdiagnosis, overtreatment 
and disease-specific mortality. 
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Methods  
Table 1. Summary of methods of the included studies  
 Design Method Data Analysis 
Paper I Protocol for 
Systematic 
Review 
Standard 
Cochrane 
Methods 
Protocol  Protocol  
Paper II Systematic 
Review 
Standard 
Cochrane 
Methods 
Data from 
RCTs (post-hoc 
from non-
randomised 
studies) 
Qualitative syn-
thesis (no meta-
analyses per-
formed due to 
lack of data) 
Paper III Reanalyses 
and narrative 
review 
Assessment of 
evidence base 
for harms and 
reanalyses of 
data from pub-
lished studies 
Published data 
from RCTs and 
non-randomised 
studies 
  
Excess inci-
dence method 
and qualitative 
synthesis 
Paper IVa Registry study 
- cohort 
Analyses of 
differences 
between a co-
hort of screened 
versus a cohort 
of non-screened 
men  
Individual data 
from registries: 
cause of death, 
inpatient, outpa-
tient and 
Swedvasc, soci-
oeconomic data 
from Statistics 
Sweden 
Unadjusted - 
Nelson-Aalen 
plots (incidence 
rate ratios, risk 
differences) 
Adjusted - pro-
pensity score 
weighting, gen-
eralized estimat-
ing equations  
(odds ratios, risk 
differences) 
Paper IVb Registry study 
- before and 
after 
Trends before 
and after screen-
ing and in 
screened versus 
non-screened 
age groups 
Ecological data 
from registries: 
cause of death, 
inpatient, outpa-
tient and 
Swedvasc 
Descriptive 
statistics 
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Papers I and II 
We performed a Cochrane systematic review of benefits and harms of 
screening for malignant melanoma. Prior to performing the systemat-
ic review, we published a peer-reviewed protocol where all outcomes, 
methods and statistical analyses were pre-specified. We used standard 
methodological procedures expected by Cochrane (Higgins 2011).  
Our inclusion criteria were: randomised controlled trials, including 
cluster-randomised trials, that compared screening for malignant mel-
anoma with no screening, regardless of screening modality or setting, 
in any type of population and in any age group where people are not 
suspected of having malignant melanoma. 
 
Paper III 
We conducted a narrative review of the available evidence base for 
harms of AAA screening. We included data from the randomised tri-
als of AAA screening found in the systematic review on AAA screen-
ing from the USPSTF. We also included data from studies not 
included in the USPSTF review: cohort studies of AAA screening, 
observational studies of trends in AAA-incidence and qualitative 
studies on psychosocial consequences of AAA screening. We estab-
lished definitions of overdiagnosis and overtreatment in AAA screen-
ing. We estimated rates of overdiagnosis and overtreatment caused by 
AAA screening, as well as the effects of a lowered threshold for the 
AAA-diagnosis on the rate of overdiagnosis, based on published data 
from 1) randomised trials and 2) a cohort study, using the excess-
incidence approach.  
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Paper IV 
The AAA screening programme in Sweden was introduced step-wise 
county by county between 2006 and 2015. Together with the well-
developed population registries in Sweden, this presented a unique 
possibility for the evaluation of a contemporary, public AAA screen-
ing programme. 
For study IVa, we conducted a cohort study using individual, anony-
mised registry data on AAA-incidence, the rate of AAA-surgery and 
AAA-related mortality between 2006 to 2015, for a cohort of 25 265 
men invited to screening within the Swedish AAA screening pro-
gramme and a contemporaneous cohort of 106 087 age-matched 
Swedish men not invited to screening because they lived in geograph-
ical regions where screening was not yet implemented. We analysed 
differences in the outcomes between the screening cohort and the 
non-screening cohort at 6 years of follow-up. 
For study IVb, we analysed trends for the same outcomes before and 
after the introduction of screening, and in screened versus non-
screened age groups, in all Swedish men 40 to 99 years of age be-
tween 1987 and 2015.  
The registries used in study IVa and IVb were the Swedish Cause of 
Death Registry, the Swedish inpatient and outpatient registries and 
the Swedish national registry for vascular surgery (Swedvasc). Indi-
vidual data on socioeconomic status and emigration for the men in-
cluded in our cohorts, as well as population statistics for all men 
above 40 years of age, were retrieved from Statistics Sweden.  
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Results 
Papers I and II 
Two studies met our inclusion criteria, but these where not designed 
to estimate our outcomes; the first study was a randomised trial of an 
intervention developed to increase performance of skin self-
examination and the second study was a pilot-study for a planned 
cluster-randomised trial of population-based screening for malignant 
melanoma. No results that could be included in our analyses were 
reported from these studies. At the time of the review, there were no 
published or unpublished data available on our pre-specified out-
comes. 
Post-hoc, we choose to evaluate some of the most influential non-
randomised studies suggesting a beneficial effect of screening for ma-
lignant melanoma. We found a serious risk of bias in these studies.  
 
Paper III 
We found no previous estimates of overdiagnosis caused by AAA 
screening. Based on data from the randomised trials performed in the 
1980s and 1990s, we estimated that 176 of 10 000 men invited to 
AAA screening were overdiagnosed with AAA 13 years after screen-
ing (95% CI 150 to 202) (Figure 5). These men were unnecessarily 
turned into patients and may have experienced appreciable anxiety 
throughout their remaining lives. Moreover, 37 of these men unnec-
essarily had preventive surgery (95% CI 15 to 60) and statistically 2 of 
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them died as a consequence. According to our estimates, 45% of all 
AAAs detected at screening were overdiagnosed 13 years after 
screening. Based on data from a cohort study with 10-20 year follow-
up, we estimated that lowering the AAA definition from 30 to 25 mm 
would double AAA prevalence and substantially increase the rate of 
overdiagnosis (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 5. Overdiagnosis estimated from a randomised trial with 13-year follow-up. 
Overdiagnosis was estimated to 45% of all screen-detected abdominal aortic aneu-
rysms. 
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Figure 6. Overdiagnosis according to diameter at initial scan estimated from a co-
hort study with 10-20 year follow-up. Overdiagnosis rates: 26-29 mm: 87%, 30-39 
mm: 56%, 40-54 mm: 17%, above 54 mm: 11%, all above 30 mm: 38%, all above 
26 mm: 58%. 
 
Paper IV 
In our analysis of population trends (IVb), we found that AAA-
mortality has dropped about 70% in Swedish men aged 65 to 74 over 
the past two decades. Reductions were similar in areas offered and 
not offered screening, and in screened and non-screened age groups. 
In our analysis of screened and non-screened cohorts (IVa), we found 
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a non-significant reduction in disease-specific mortality with screen-
ing 6 years after screening (odds ratio 0.76, 95% CI 0.38 to 1.51). In 
absolute numbers, this means 2 men (95% CI -3 to 7) may have 
avoided AAA-death for every 10 000 men invited (not statistically 
significant). At the same time, 49 men were likely overdiagnosed 
(95% CI 25 to 73), of whom 19 men were likely overtreated, i.e. had 
unnecessary surgery with a risk of mortality and morbidity (95% CI 1 
to 37). The remaining 30 men were offered regular follow-up with 
potential psychosocial consequences.   
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Discussion of the studies 
Papers I and II 
Screening for malignant melanoma has been adopted in many West-
ern countries although there is no evidence from randomised trials of 
a beneficial effect. The most influential non-randomised study sug-
gested a beneficial effect of screening for malignant melanoma but 
had a serious risk of bias favouring screening. Additionally, other 
non-randomised studies suggest harmful effects due to substantial 
overdiagnosis as well as considerable opportunity costs (Welch 2005, 
Norgaard 2011). 
 
Limitations 
Our choice to include only randomised trials in this systematic review 
entailed some limitations. Our rationale was that including data from 
non-randomised studies in a Cochrane review on population screen-
ing might legitimise the use of such interventions based on low-
quality evidence for a mortality benefit. However, if the merits of 
studies that have been pivotal for far-reaching public health decisions 
are not assessed, it reduces the relevance of the corresponding 
Cochrane reviews. As a compromise we choose post-hoc to evaluate 
the most relevant non-randomised studies in the Discussion section 
of the review. However, to evaluate some non-randomised studies 
without performing a systematic search might have introduced selec-
tion bias. 
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Furthermore, to rely on evidence from randomised trials only when 
evaluating benefits and harms of screening is undoubtedly problemat-
ic, since many of the effects of screening are not easily captured by 
randomised trials (see the General Discussion). The reason that this 
strategy might be motivated here is that arguably screening should not 
even be considered if there is no evidence from high-quality random-
ised trials of a beneficial effect on mortality; if there is no reliable evi-
dence of a benefit, then screening asymptomatic citizens is not 
warranted, no matter what the harms are (Andermann 2008). 
 
Paper III 
Screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm was introduced in several 
countries without adequate exploration and quantification of harms. 
Our study suggests that AAA screening causes considerable harm 
through overdiagnosis and overtreatment. Furthermore, we found 
that the rate of overdiagnosis would substantially increase if the cut-
off for the diagnosis of an AAA was lowered from 30 to 25 mm. 
Noteworthy, this change of definition of an AAA is advocated for in 
the scientific community, and has been partly adopted within the 
Swedish screening programme, although the potential harms have not 
been adequately investigated. Moreover, the recent drop in AAA-
incidence reduces the absolute benefit of screening and might worsen 
the benefit-to-harm balance, which means that data on both benefits 
and harms from the randomised trials of AAA screening is out-dated. 
 
Limitations 
One limitation to this study is the non-systematic approach. This was 
based on pragmatism; there were already systematic reviews of this 
topic from Cochrane (Cosford 2007) and the USPSTF (Guirguis-
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Blake 2014). It was not likely that we would have found randomised 
trials that they had not. The aim of this study was to explore harms 
that had not been adequately addressed in these reviews, which might 
motivate our non-systematic approach. However, there is a risk of 
selection bias. Furthermore, to lump results from the randomised tri-
als of AAA screening might be questionable, since they display con-
siderable heterogeneity. We did not explore this heterogeneity, which 
is a methodological weakness of our study. Regarding our estimates 
of overdiagnosis and overtreatment, there were multiple biases due to 
inherent limitations of the available data. These are described in the 
publication. 
 
Paper IV 
The substantial changes in AAA-incidence and AAA-mortality for 
reasons other than screening motivate contemporary estimates of the 
effects of the intervention. The gradual implementation of AAA 
screening in Sweden and the availability of reliable population data 
presented a unique possibility.  
Screening only had a minor effect on the decline in AAA-mortality in 
the Swedish population. The observed large reduction at population 
level was likely caused by reduced smoking. The effect on AAA-
mortality in Sweden was 7% of that in the largest randomised trial at 
similar follow-up (2 vs 27 avoided AAA-deaths per 10 000 invited 
men). The observed rate of overdiagnosis was 28% of that estimated 
from the same trial (49 vs 176 per 10 000 invited men) and the rate of 
overtreatment was 51% (19 vs 37 per 10 000 invited men). This 
means that the benefit-to-harm balance is substantially worse today 
compared to that seen in the randomised trials that led to the intro-
duction of AAA screening.  
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An aspect that we did not investigate in our study is that AAA screen-
ing seems to result in unforeseen diagnostic cascades, with potentially 
substantial effects on the benefit-to-harm balance of the intervention. 
Within the Swedish AAA screening programme, additional screening 
for iliac aneurysms is regularly performed (personal communication – 
mail correspondence available on request) and men with screen-
detected AAAs are routinely screened for popliteal aneurysms (Wrede 
2017). A study from Sweden showed that 24% of all men undergoing 
surgery for popliteal aneurysms were diagnosed due to AAA screen-
ing, a number that is likely to rise in the future (Wrede 2017). Thorac-
ic or thoracoabdominal aneurysms are sometimes detected at 
angiography of the aorta performed due to a screen-detected AAA 
(Ohlsson 2016). Some researchers even advocate that all patients with 
an AAA should also be screened for thoracic aneurysms (Ziganshin 
2016). The benefits and harms of such additional screening are not 
adequately investigated. The potential for harm is appreciable since 
elective surgery of asymptomatic aneurysms has considerable risks – 
in the case of thoracic aneurysms mortality is much higher than for 
abdominal aneurysms. Furthermore, one study found that 59% of 
patients undergoing elective AAA-surgery with endovascular tech-
niques had an aortic diameter below 55 mm (Schanzer 2011) despite 
evidence that surgery on small AAAs is not beneficial (Guirguis Blake 
2014). It has been argued that AAA screening, by detecting many 
small AAAs, is a major driver behind this development (Harris 2012).  
These examples demonstrate that the consequences of screening pro-
grammes in a “real life” setting are difficult to foresee. There are of-
ten downstream effects that have not been investigated in the 
randomised trials. Arguably, the above-mentioned sequels of AAA 
screening should be carefully evaluated and taken into account in 
both cost-effectiveness analyses and estimates of the benefit-to-harm 
balance of AAA screening in the future. 
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In conclusion, the benefit-to-harm balance of AAA screening in con-
temporary populations is questionable and our study suggests that the 
continued justification of the screening programme should be revisit-
ed. However, neither new evidence of harms of AAA screening, con-
flicting results from long-term follow-up of randomised trials, nor a 
dramatic drop in disease-incidence substantially limiting the beneficial 
effects of AAA screening have led to consideration about the contin-
uation of the screening programmes (Keller 2016a, Keller 2016b, 
Larsson 2016). Instead, implementation of screening for abdominal 
aortic aneurysm is discussed in additional countries (Lindholt 2013). 
Further, expanding screening by including women, despite lack of 
evidence (Ulug 2016), and by lowering the cut-off diameter for the 
diagnosis is advocated for in the scientific community (Svensjö 2011, 
Darwood 2012, Thompson 2012) (related papers 2 and 3 in Appen-
dix).  
 
Limitations 
This is a retrospective registry-based cohort study. Although we have 
a contemporaneous, same-age control group of non-screened men, it 
is not a randomised trial and there are differences in socioeconomic 
factors between compared groups, as well as differences between re-
gions in AAA-mortality and incidence that pre-date organised AAA 
screening. Although we did adjust for socioeconomic factors on an 
individual level, we cannot exclude residual confounding. Further, 
there is a risk of misclassification in the registries, which is discussed 
in more detail in the publication. It is not possible to know if, or in 
what direction, this may introduce bias in our estimates. 
Even though our hypotheses and analysis plan arose before we ob-
tained data, we did not publish a pre-registered protocol, making se-
lective outcome reporting impossible to control for by independent 
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researchers. Furthermore, due to restrictions from the registries and 
ethical committee, we cannot share individual data, making independ-
ent reanalysis impossible, except for analyses of aggregated data. 
Since meaningful follow-up was limited to 6 years in our study the full 
effect of screening might not have been captured, which may lead to 
an underestimate of the benefit and overestimates of overdiagnosis 
and overtreatment. In the largest randomised trial of AAA screening, 
the majority of the effect on AAA-mortality was obtained at 7 years; 
0.27 percentage point reduction in AAA-mortality at 7 years (Kim 
2007), 0.42 At 10 years (Thompson 2009), and 0.46 at 13 years 
(Thompson 2012). If applying trends from this trial to our data, the 
absolute effect of screening on AAA-mortality would increase from 
0.02 percentage points at 6 years to 0.03 at 13 years of follow-up. 
Even if some degree of overestimation of overdiagnosis and over-
treatment cannot be excluded, we do not believe that further follow-
up would change the overall conclusion of our study. 
Despite thorough attempts, we were unable to obtain basic infor-
mation such as precise starting dates and age groups invited from 
those responsible for the Swedish screening programme. Judging 
from incidence peaks observed in our dataset, we found indications 
that men may have been screened systematically prior to their 65th 
birthday, leading to underestimates of overdiagnosis and overtreat-
ment in our analyses. Indeed, it is regrettable that outside evaluation 
of the screening programmes is associated with such hassles.  
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General discussion 
Diseases like malignant melanomas and abdominal aortic aneurysms 
can have devastating consequences. Numerous people have seen their 
loved ones depart this life too early in the trail of aggressive, fatal dis-
ease. We all share the vision that medicine will one day find ways to 
avoid such suffering and loss. Indeed, screening has a potential to 
cause a lot of good. However, the envisioned benefits are not always 
materialized in praxis, and mass screening seems to have an inherent 
potential to cause unintended harms.  
The main overarching finding of this thesis is that benefits of screen-
ing receive much more attention and appreciation than harms in the 
scientific literature. This is not a novel finding, nor specific to the 
screening modalities investigated in this thesis (Jørgensen 2007, 
Jørgensen 2009, Woloshin 2012, Heleno 2013, Harris 2014, DeFrank 
2015, Kolthoff 2016).  
Arguably, screening for malignant melanoma has been adopted in the 
Western world based on an unfounded enthusiasm for screening, 
likely underpinned by vested interests (Jørgensen 2017). In the case of 
screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm, it seems as if a disease-
specific mortality benefit seen in two of the four randomised trials, 
although out-dated and small in absolute numbers, trumps most 
counterarguments when it comes to policy making. In this context, it 
is important to reflect on where the burden of proof lies: no matter 
how terrible the disease in question is, we should be reasonably cer-
tain that a screening programme does more good than harm before 
implementing it. This thesis is devoted to that task. 
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I argue that the cases of screening for malignant melanoma and 
screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm point to some of the fun-
damental problems inherent in medical thinking, science and policy-
making today. The picture on the front-page of this thesis is meant to 
illustrate this viewpoint. It is a reference to “the streetlight effect”, i.e. 
when we search for our keys where there is light, although we 
dropped them somewhere else. This is a metaphor for our propensity 
to focus on aspects that appear well demarcated and intuitively ap-
pealing to seek control over, while ignoring less approachable but 
sometimes more meaningful answers that are only to be found in-
between the biomedical light posts. 
In this General Discussion I will apply a wider perspective and con-
template on the broader and deeper meaning of the topic of this the-
sis; screening for potentially fatal disease. Never abandoning my 
respect for people who might have good reasons for seeing things 
differently than me, this General Discussion will focus on the prob-
lematic aspects of screening. 
Some of the reasoning below has been published by me and my co-
authors in papers related to this thesis (see List of related papers). 
These are available in the Appendix.  
 
The fundamental appeal of screening 
Why is screening so popular and un-problematized in Western socie-
ties? The enthusiasm does not seem to be proportional to the factual 
evidence since the documented effect of even the most beneficial 
screening programmes is quite small in absolute numbers (Prasad 
2016). Indeed, far more effective interventions receive much less ap-
preciation (I will come back to this later).  
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The popularity paradox 
Benefits of screening are intuitively appealing for most of us, while 
the harms are much harder to grasp. Laymen as well as clinicians tend 
to overestimate benefits of screening, while underestimating harms 
(Schwartz 2004, Wegwarth 2012, Hoffmann 2015). In one study of 
US adults, two thirds stated that they would want to be screened for 
cancer even if there was no treatment available, nine out of ten 
thought that cancer screening is always a good idea and three out of 
four stated that it will always save lives to find cancer early (Schwartz 
2004). In a study of US physicians, three out of four stated that an 
improved 5-year survival rate proves that screening saves lives 
(Wegwarth 2012). As accounted for in the Introduction of this thesis, 
none of these answers are correct. 
The concept of overdiagnosis is not easily conveyed to lay people 
(Hersch 2015). Recurrently, public media portrays celebrities who 
claim that their lives have been saved by screening (Chen 2013). In 
reality, this is impossible to know on the individual level for the ma-
jority of cases and for many people with screen-detected conditions, 
the risk that they have been harmed by screening may actually be 
greater than the chance that their lives have been saved (Welch 2011). 
The consequence is a popularity paradox; the more people that are 
(over)diagnosed through screening, the more popular screening get, 
no matter if the screening in question is beneficial or not (Raffle 
2007). 
 
Conflicts of interest in research 
The fact that researchers provide evidence for benefits but fail to do 
the same for harms (Jørgensen 2007, Heleno 2013, Harris 2014, De-
Frank 2015) arguably contributes to the popularity of screening also 
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in the general public. A systematic review of randomised cancer 
screening trials found that the most important harm of screening, 
overdiagnosis, was quantified in only 7% of all screening trials (Hele-
no 2013). Another systematic review found that the psychosocial 
consequences of screening were not adequately explored for any of 
the five screening modalities investigated (DeFrank 2015). 
This is likely in part due to financial conflict of interests within re-
search. However, even in the absence of financial gain, intellectual 
bias amongst researchers might still contribute to the problem. In-
deed, it is common that researchers downplay or fail to report harms 
of the interventions they have developed and/or studied, that bene-
fits are overestimated, and that conclusions are overstated and not 
supported by the data (Schwartz 1999, Glasziou 2014, Ioannidis 2014, 
Horton 2015). When we as researchers have dedicated time, resources 
and heart into a research project that we believe in, few of us are fully 
prepared to change our minds in accordance with the actual findings. 
Research careers are built on the benefits of medical interventions (or 
the harms of interventions, which one might suggest in my case). 
Measures to tackle the problems related to intellectual and financial 
conflicts of interests within research have been taken. A series of pa-
pers with the overarching theme “Increasing value and reducing 
waste in biomedical research”, published in the Lancet in 2014, sum-
marize many of these initiatives (Macleod 2014). Several recommen-
dations were made in these publications, many of which aimed at 
more transparency, for example by increased use of prospectively 
published protocols (not only for randomised trials), sharing of raw 
data from studies to enable independent evaluation of the derived 
results, and thorough description of the methods used to enable rep-
lication of studies (Glasziou 2014, Ioannidis 2014). 
But even if important progress has been made, these problems are 
still widespread. For example, in a recent randomised trial of screen-
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ing for cardiovascular disease (abdominal aortic aneurysm, peripheral 
artery disease and hypertension) published in the Lancet (Lindholt 
2017a), harms where very poorly reported. Additionally, a small but 
statistically significant reduction in total mortality made the authors 
conclude that "the observed reduction of mortality risk from AAA mortality, 
peripheral artery disease, and hypertension" should lead to considerations of 
implementing the intervention. However, the study could not demon-
strate an effect on cause specific mortality of any kind. The apparent 
effect on total mortality was based on small numbers and was distrib-
uted between several different causes of death with no predominance 
of those causes targeted by the intervention (Lindholt 2017b). A pos-
sible reduction in cancer mortality contributed twice as much to the 
difference in total mortality as the reduction in deaths from ab-
dominal aortic aneurysm (Lindholt 2017b). In conclusion, the exact 
mechanism behind the observed difference in total mortality remains 
elusive and the risk of random error should be considered (Jørgensen 
2018). It would have been appropriate with a more cautious conclu-
sion from the authors.  
 
Conflicts of interest in policy making 
There is no common unit of measurement for benefits and harms of 
screening and the balance will always depend on a subjective value 
judgement, which no one has exclusive privilege to assess (Harris 
2015, Carter 2017). Therefore, when authorities decide if a screening 
programme should be implemented or not, or if an existing screening 
programme should be deimplemented or continued, the process 
should be transparent and the inherent value judgements should be 
made explicit (Barratt 2017, Carter 2017). 
Globally, the importance of having independent panels with a wide 
range of expertise, also from outside of medical science, to evaluate 
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the evidence base in medical policy making is increasingly emphasised 
(Barratt 2017). For example, when France recently performed an in-
quiry on breast cancer screening, an independent steering committee 
was appointed (the process of the inquiry was presented in a recent 
publication from Barratt and colleagues, on which the following ex-
position is based, Barratt 2017). The steering committee gathered 
health professionals with a wide range of expertise (oncology, general 
medicine, epidemiology, public health), as well as social sciences pro-
fessionals (anthropology, law, economics, history of science, bioeth-
ics). Particular effort was taken to only include people free of both 
financial and intellectual conflict of interests in relation to breast can-
cer screening. Additionally, input from citizens with diverse socioec-
onomic background was carefully ensured. The inquiry recommended 
to either end the national breast cancer screening programme, or rad-
ically reform the current programme. This recommendation is in line 
with the conclusion of another independent review of breast cancer 
screening from Switzerland. Furthermore, in the French review, the 
need for complete and balanced information to potential screening 
participants was emphasised, as well as the acknowledgement of 
overdiagnosis as a serious harm. This is also in agreement with the 
conclusion of the Swiss review, as well as another independent review 
from the UK, but in contrast to many other recommendations from 
official bodies (Barratt 2017). Barratt and colleagues discuss what 
might account for the differences between the independent reviews 
and the other recommendations. They suggest: 
”One possible explanation is that some panels may be 
compromised by the conflicts of interest of members, 
something carefully avoided in the 3 European inquiries. A 
broader range of disciplinary perspectives may also be im-
portant, as panel members with expertise in human and so-
cial sciences may be more likely to raise and discuss social, 
legal, and ethical considerations relevant to population 
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screening. Panels that make recommendations about medi-
cal treatments do not typically seek the values and prefer-
ences of citizens in formulating recommendations. Cancer 
screening programs, however, impact the lives of the public, 
and their preferences are important when reaching deci-
sions.” (Barratt 2017) 
It could be argued that such rigorous processes as in the French re-
view of breast cancer screening are too expensive and resource con-
suming to be expected for all screening programmes in every country. 
I do acknowledge the dilemma for medical policy makers who might 
have many pressing questions to attend to. However, the costs of 
making rigorous and careful evaluations of screening programmes are 
arguably small compared to the costs of running a public screening 
programme (Barratt 2017).  
Furthermore, processes for policy decisions today are often unac-
ceptably far from the process described above. For example, in the 
Swedish Social Board of Health and Welfare’s investigation of screen-
ing for abdominal aortic aneurysm, the experts assessing the evidence 
base were all vascular surgeons that had been responsible or involved 
in implementing the screening programme in Sweden (Johansson 
2016a, Johansson 2016b, Johansson 2016c). The final decision to en-
dorse screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm was taken by a group 
where the vast majority were responsible for screening programmes 
for abdominal aortic aneurysm in their counties, and there was very 
limited representation of expertise outside of the community of vas-
cular surgery (Johansson 2016a, Johansson 2016b, Johansson 2016c). 
Arguably, this indicates a high risk of intellectual bias, which ques-
tions the objectivity and conclusions of the investigation. We have 
criticised the review for being biased in favour of screening, with un-
due emphasis on studies suggesting a beneficial effect of screening 
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while ignoring evidence of harms (Johansson 2016a, Johansson 
2016b, Johansson 2016c). 
 
Societal interventions vs screening individuals 
The decision to implement, or not to implement, screening is never 
based on science alone (Carter 2017). Screening programmes are just 
as much sociological phenomena, influenced by the progression of 
thoughts in society as a whole, as they are a consequence of the factu-
al numbers found in randomised trials. Western culture is permeated 
by a strong focus on the individual (Fugelli 2006). I wonder if our 
attraction towards individualistic approaches, both within medicine 
and in society as a whole, is a central reason to the seemingly dispro-
portional enthusiasm for screening today? 
Screening for lung cancer is estimated to save about 12 000 of the 
approximately 160 000 deaths from lung cancer every year in the US 
(Ma 2013). At the same time, lung cancer screening results in harms. 
Examples of such harms are overdiagnosis and subsequent major 
surgery with a risk of serious complications, and false positives fol-
lowed by biopsies of the lungs, a procedure that is associated with 
medical risks (Moyer 2014). In the same country, interventions at the 
societal level to decrease smoking was estimated to save eight million 
premature deaths between 1964 to 2012, which corresponds to more 
than 160 000 prevented deaths in the US every year (Holford 2014), 
i.e. more than 10 times as many lives saved per year as by screening 
for lung cancer. In addition to the difference in number of lives 
saved, the latter intervention strategy is also cheaper, and has consid-
erably less potential for harm. It also affects a substantial number of 
other diseases and cause of mortality. 
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Apart from societal interventions aimed directly at improving health, 
other societal factors aiming at social equity and flourishing, e.g. a 
well-functioning education system and creative child-welfare initia-
tives, likely by far exceed the effects of interventions within the health 
care system (Marmot 2012). Nobel prize winner Professor James J 
Heckman’s research indicate that social investments in early child-
hood, especially for disadvantaged families, have fundamental benefi-
cial effects on both health and economy and is not only cost-effective 
but actually cost saving (Heckman 2006). However, public health 
spending has grown rapidly in high-income countries over most of 
the last half a century (OECD 2015). Inevitably, increased expendi-
ture on the health care system will take resources from other societal 
sectors. Policy makers have to choose where to spend the money, and 
currently the health care sector gets more and more of the finite re-
sources. This development seems irrational from a public health per-
spective. And to spend resources on screening programmes could be 
questioned in this context, since even the most beneficial screening 
programmes have quite limited effect in absolute numbers (Prasad 
2016) in addition to the previously mentioned downsides and harms. 
Why do we find it much more appealing to improve public health by 
declaring war against life-threatening disease amongst asymptomatic 
individuals, rather than posing smoking bans on restaurants, or deal-
ing with systemic causes of alienation and exclusion of vulnerable 
groups? Why are we so keen to cling to individual approaches to im-
prove public health even when the effect is known to be limited, at 
least in relation to other possible strategies? Is this propensity to fo-
cus on the individual something deeply human? Or is it a phenome-
non specific to Western culture, formed by centuries of history, the 
Enlightenment and the Scientific revolution? 
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Medical visions and steady progress 
In his thesis, Norwegian researcher Henrik Vogt discusses the role 
that the creation of expectations and hype play in biomedicine. He 
argues that in the case of genetics and precision medicine, medical 
researchers act as visionaries who promise continuous progression 
and market “simple” biomedical solutions as means to virtually extin-
guish ill health and suffering in the future (Vogt 2017). This is interre-
lated to an aspiration to control health and a reluctance to accept 
uncertainty in our societies. But we seem to forget that the human 
body is an incredibly complex system existing in an even more com-
plex context, that causes of disease are multi-faceted, and that disease 
and disease progression is exceedingly difficult to foresee (Fugelli 
2006, Hofmann 2015, Vogt 2017).  
Inflated and irresponsible visions of the effects of medical interven-
tions might redirect resources within the health care system, or from 
societal interventions to the health care system, which might in turn 
have ruinous effects for the health and well-being of the population 
(Pétursson 2012). In her thesis, Icelandic researcher Margrét Ólafía 
Tómasdóttir, showed that nearly half of the adult Norwegian popula-
tion (20 to 79 years) had multimorbidity according to the classical 
definition (two or more chronic conditions), and nearly one fourth 
when defined as three or more chronic conditions. Considering that 
Norway has one of the most long-living and healthy populations in 
the world, this epidemic of medical diagnoses arguably signals a ques-
tionable expansion of the territory of medicine (Tómasdóttir 2016). 
Another Icelandic researcher, Hálfdán Pétursson, showed in his thesis 
that if evidence-based guidelines for cardiovascular prevention were 
fully applied in Norway, more general practitioners than existed at the 
time of the study would be required to handle hypertension only, i.e. 
there would be no time for general practitioners to take care of ill pa-
tients (Pétursson 2012). 
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I argue that mass screening fits well into a narrative evolving around 
medical visions and steady progress. Researchers and policy makers 
have great influence on the future path of medicine. Instead of 
providing attractive but partially unrealistic visions, we ought to 
shoulder this responsibility in a reflective, sensible and conscious way 
(Getz 2006, Fugelli 2006, Vogt 2017).  
 
Consequences of the evidence hierarchy 
An interview study of women with osteoporosis detected at a bone-
scan revealed that the asymptomatic diagnosis fostered a new body 
image. The women interpreted the scan result to mean bodily fragili-
ty, which they incorporated into their bodily perception; they started 
to experience themselves as weak with reduced capacity (Reventlow 
2006). 
Such existentially loaded harms of screening are not easily captured 
by the research methods at the top of the evidence hierarchy of evi-
dence-based medicine (Munn 2014, Shaw 2014, Greenhalgh 2015). 
Indeed, frontrunners of evidence-based medicine have long acknowl-
edged that different research questions require different methods; the 
perception that randomised trials always present the best answer is 
thereby flawed. Questions about prognosis, aetiology, diagnosis, dis-
ease frequency and adverse events are often best answered with other 
study designs (Glasziou 2004). Arguably, carefully designed qualitative 
studies are needed to explore and fully appreciate the subtler and 
more existential harms of screening. However, knowledge from quali-
tative studies is generally downplayed in evidence synthesis and policy 
making (Munn 2014, Shaw 2014, Greenhalgh 2015). This points to a 
fundamental problem within evidence-based medicine and medical 
policy making today, namely that the evidence hierarchy tends to di-
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rect our focus towards outcomes that are easy to measure, at the ex-
pense of the more indistinct outcomes that are difficult to measure 
(Greenhalgh 2015, Kelly 2015). Referring again to my light post met-
aphor, crucial aspects of medical interventions end up between the 
light posts and are not picked up. Because of the way evidence-based 
medicine is (mal)practiced today, it does not only become a tool to 
inform us about the available evidence for a certain intervention, but 
also forms our perception of what is important (Forssén 2011). 
 
Screening – deeper and broader meaning 
Inherent in medical science today lies an ideal of value-neutrality 
(Kelly 2015, Carter 2017), described below by Forssén and colleagues 
(Forssén 2011): 
“A common metaphor for science is a cone of light illumi-
nating an increasing part of a dark map. In this image of 
science.. ..the scientist has no personal location, and is invis-
ible, signifying objectivity and scientific freedom.. ..The 
most important consequence of this ‘functional myth’ is 
that the scientific community cannot be held responsible 
for what it simply ‘uncovers’. Therefore, the scientist has no 
moral responsibility.” 
An often-unquestioned framework of medical interpretation and clas-
sification permeates research (Lock 1988, Getz 2006, Forssén 2011). 
But knowledge must be interpreted in relation to the context in which 
it is created (Haraway 1991). By directing “the cone of the light” re-
searchers, and funders of research, have great influence on society’s 
understanding of what is counted as disease, and what is considered 
as cause, prevention and cure (Forssén 2011).  
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As a consequence of the increased focus on prevention and early de-
tection within Western medicine, many diagnoses today do not exist 
in their own right, but might be interpreted as artefacts created by 
increasing medical (sub)classification and (over)investigation (Getz 
2006, Pétursson 2012, Tómasdóttir 2017). Asymptomatic diseases 
and risk factors found at screening are examples of this (Martin 2014, 
Järvinen 2015), as well as a myriad of medically unexplained symp-
toms. Other examples involve expanding disease definitions (Moyni-
han 2013, Cundy 2014), and the fact that more and more of ordinary 
life circumstances are defined as medical problems (Dowrick 2013, 
Meixel 2015).  
This development is underpinned by values. For example; random-
ised trials cannot tell us whether symptoms of stressful life circum-
stances should be labelled as depression or not, or if we should give 
the majority of the adult population pills for cardiovascular risk fac-
tors. This is because these decisions are at least partly based on nor-
mative, not empirical, questions. No amount of data can thereby 
justify them. But the underpinning values are seldom reflected upon 
in the scientific publications. And evidence syntheses’ rarely zoom 
out to reflect on the construct of the disease or the intervention in 
question, or the broader consequences for society as a whole. In this 
way even the good systematic reviews and evidence-based guidelines, 
with adequate evaluation of the evidence base and no vested interests, 
may contribute to establish a certain understanding of symptoms, 
medical risk or interventions, when it might have been a more sensi-
ble approach to instead question the underlying constructs them-
selves (Forssén 2011).  
Departing from the works of Ivan Illich (Illich 1974), in the context 
of screening for non-communicable life-threatening disease, ques-
tions that in my opinion have gained too little attention include: 
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How can the concept of approaching asymptomatic citizens and in-
forming them that they might have a dangerous disease be under-
stood from a value-perspective? Does screening affect our 
perceptions of health in society as a whole? Does the diagnosing of 
asymptomatic people with life-threatening disease influence our abil-
ity to trust that our bodies will tell us if we are sick and in need of 
help? Does screening change our attitude from assuming that we are 
healthy until proven otherwise, to assuming that we are sick until 
proven otherwise? And in that case, can this conception affect our 
health and well-being? What impact do screening programmes have 
on our ability to tolerate ill health, disease and even bad luck, in socie-
ty as a whole? Does the increased focus on early detection influence 
our capability to deal with the inevitable uncertainty associated with 
living? How does screening various body parts of our patients fit in 
with person-centred care and “seeing the whole person” - as opposed 
to fragmentised and reductionist health care? What does the increased 
focus on early detection and screening mean for the future direction 
of medicine?  
Such questions are not easily answered by science alone; high quality 
evidence from randomised trials will not help us deal with these is-
sues. Although qualitative studies could contribute with a deeper un-
derstanding, we also need to reflect on dimensions other than the 
strictly scientific. Researchers need to contemplate on the influence 
that their research will have on society as a whole in a much broader 
sense (Getz 2006, Fugelli 2006, Forssén 2011), and policy makers 
need to do likewise in regards to their decisions about health care. We 
should take a step back, and view our own ideas within the landscape 
of a wider history of ideas. 
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The ethical dilemma of screening 
The fundamental ethical problem of screening programmes is that 
success comes at a cost; in order to improve the prognosis for some 
people, others will be exposed to unintended harm (Shickle 1994). 
There is no scientifically correct answer to whether it is ethically ac-
ceptable for the health care system to cause harm to asymptomatic 
people through an intervention they have not themselves asked for. 
From a utilitarian perspective, screening is justifiable if it results in net 
benefit (Shickle 1994, Kelly 2015). This is of course difficult to judge 
when adequate evaluation of harms is lacking for most screening pro-
grammes. Moreover, even if harms were adequately explored and in-
vestigated, science cannot provide an answer on what constitutes a 
net benefit; to weigh benefits and harms against each other is to 
compare apples and oranges (Shickle 1994, Harris 2015). How many 
people can undergo unnecessary surgery of an abdominal aortic aneu-
rysm in order to justify the prevention of one death from the disease? 
How much distress from being labelled with a diagnosis of malignant 
melanoma, to how many people, is acceptable in order to prevent one 
melanoma-death? These decisions are value judgements, and need to 
be recognised as such (Harris 2015, Kelly 2015, Carter 2017). 
Moreover, strict utilitarianism is hardly acceptable is our societies. We 
must also consider overarching deontological principles, such as “first 
of all, do no harm” (primum non nocere) (Shickle 1994). This princi-
ple is of course not entirely applicable to medicine in general, since 
almost all interventions have harms, but may nonetheless be highly 
justified from an ethical perspective. For example, in people with ag-
gressive cancer, chemotherapy with high curative rates can arguably 
be ethically justifiable, even if this treatment has terrible side effects. 
The crucial difference between treatment of symptomatic cancer and 
screening is that in screening, harms are inflicted to people who 
would never have had any symptoms if they had not participated in 
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the intervention. When inviting asymptomatic citizens to an interven-
tion they have not asked for, a great responsibility follows (Sackett 
2002). In my opinion, this responsibility is seldom shouldered today, 
and health authorities seem to make light of the ethical dilemmas that 
screening programmes entail. 
 
Informed choices – a solution?  
Informed choice and shared decision making are increasingly pro-
posed as means to mitigate the ethical dilemmas presented by screen-
ing (Brownsword 2010, Woloshin 2012, Hoffmann 2014). Personal 
preference is emphasised in modern medicine and putting the re-
sponsibility on the shoulders of the individual seems in line with pa-
tient-centred care. At the same time, a paternalistic discourse is 
apparent in screening: an overwhelming amount of studies are done 
with the explicit agenda to increase uptake in screening (Everett 
2011), without consideration of whether participation is based on in-
formed choice or not (Ploug 2012). A shift of perspective, from pa-
ternalism to respect for people’s autonomy, is one important step 
towards an approach consistent with contemporary ethical values 
(Ploug 2012). 
However, many screening programmes do not provide information 
about harms in invitations today (Jørgensen 2009, Gøtzsche 2011, 
Ploug 2012, Kolthoff 2016), which overrides the autonomy of the 
individual. Further, many people will probably trust that an invitation 
from health authorities strongly indicates that the intervention is 
worthwhile. This assumption is emphasised by widespread use of pre-
booked appointments (versus opt-in alternatives), which short-circuit 
the decision process by indicating a seemingly correct and expected 
choice (Ploug 2012). Consequently, there is a need for a reassessment 
of invitations to current screening programmes; adequate information 
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on all important benefits and harms should be added, in addition to 
an acknowledgment that non-participation might be as rational a 
choice as participation.  
Balanced comprehensive information is important from an ethical 
perspective; however, it might not have a substantial effect on the 
ability of people to make truly informed choices based on truly per-
sonal preferences. Inherent in the idea of informed choice about 
screening participation lies an assumption that information speaking 
to our intellect is easily integrated into our understanding of risk. Yet 
research suggests that our understanding of risk relies mainly on emo-
tions and that cognitive comprehension has little effect on decision-
making (Loewenstein 2001, Slovic 2002). If emotionally charged mes-
sages have formed our perception of a particular intervention, which 
is certainly the case for many types of screening, subsequent infor-
mation is unlikely to change our understanding of that intervention 
nor our attitudes or behaviour (Slovic 2002).  
Furthermore, in the concept of informed choice lies an understanding 
about “personal preferences” that could be questioned, as done in a 
paper by Nelson and colleagues (Nelson 2007): 
“it is not clear that people have pre-existing preferences and 
values that merely need to be revealed through some elicita-
tion process. In many situations it makes little sense to 
speak of ‘‘clarifying’’ preferences because preferences may 
be created de novo in response to the values elicitation pro-
cess.” 
The concept of personal preferences in regards to screening becomes 
even more complex when considering that “taking care of ones 
health” (for example by participating in screening, or checking ones 
blood pressure or blood lipids) is considered more or less a societal 
responsibility today, an attitude underpinned by vested interests with-
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in the “health industry” (Fugelli 2006, Ploug 2012). Indeed, it is irre-
sponsible to consider patient preferences without taking into account 
that strong market forces are pushing peoples preferences in the di-
rection of more medicine.  
Personalised risk communication has been proposed as a means to 
increase informed choice about screening (Edwards 2013). Although 
appealing, are such methods sound from a public-health perspective? 
Should we use scarce resources to maximise informed choice among 
healthy individuals when money could instead be spent on people 
with the greatest need, those who are already ill? 
In conclusion, balanced information in invitations to screening seems 
merely a small step towards true informed choices based on truly per-
sonal preferences. Equally important is a better understanding of the 
benefits and harms of screening among journalists, clinicians, re-
searchers, editors, and policy makers and a more nuanced debate 
about screening in the media (related paper 4 in Appendix).  
However, even if truly informed choices based on truly personal 
preferences were possible, it would still be ethically problematic to 
approach healthy people and inform them that they might have a 
dangerous disease and that screening could save them. At the same 
time there are serious harms that might outweigh the benefit, which 
the invitee must also consider. On the basis of this information, they 
must now take responsibility and make an informed choice about par-
ticipation. This responsibility for the decision cannot be avoided, be-
cause the invitation itself makes a choice mandatory – we have placed 
the individual in a situation with no possibility to avoid making a 
choice, and in the process we have transferred responsibility from the 
health care provider to the individual (related paper 1 in Appendix).  
Who considers the ethics and takes responsibility for presenting peo-
ple with such a complex choice in the first place? When discussing 
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the ethics of informed choice, it is essential to consider the locus of 
initiative. That is, who started the process leading to the need for an 
informed choice? The ethics of informed choice is fairly uncompli-
cated in situations where clear-cut needs of the patient are the driver 
for an unambiguous diagnosis. But screening is not driven primarily 
by the patient’s own agenda, which changes the ethical premises of 
informed choice (related paper 1 in Appendix).  
Informed choice must not be used to justify the introduction or con-
tinued use of screening programmes in which the balance between 
benefits and harms is doubtful, and informed choice does not remove 
the responsibility for offering such screening programmes from 
health authorities. A strong focus on informed choice and shared de-
cision making in preventive medicine entail ethical considerations that 
have gained too little attention. Furthermore, true informed choice 
remains utopic in our cultural context and does not solve the funda-
mental dilemma of screening; is it ethically acceptable to cause serious 
harm in some people to improve the prognosis of others? 
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Conclusion 
Papers I and II 
Screening for malignant melanoma is widely adopted in the Western 
world although there is no data from randomised trials on the bene-
fits and harms of the intervention. Due to uncertainty of benefit, and 
risk of harm through overdiagnosis and opportunity costs, opportun-
istic or organised screening for malignant melanoma should not be 
implemented or recommended outside the confines of a well-
designed, randomised trial. 
 
Paper III 
Screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm was introduced in several 
countries without adequate exploration and quantification of harms. 
Likewise, a lowered cut-off for the definition on an abdominal aortic 
aneurysm within the screening programmes is at the brink of imple-
mentation without adequate consideration of potential harms.  
 
Paper IV 
Screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm had only a minor effect on 
disease-specific mortality in Sweden; only 7% of the benefit estimated 
in the largest trial of screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm was 
observed in our study. Large reductions in mortality from abdominal 
aortic aneurysm were present in both screened and non-screened co-
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horts and thus mainly caused by other factors, likely reduced smok-
ing. The clinical significance of screening for abdominal aortic aneu-
rysm in contemporary populations is therefore questionable. The 
absolute number of overdiagnosed and overtreated cases caused by 
screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm was also reduced compared 
to the randomised trials, but not to the same extent (28% and 51% 
respectively). The small benefit and substantially worsened benefit-to-
harm balance questions the continued justification of screening for 
abdominal aortic aneurysm. 
 
General conclusion 
The overarching conclusion of this thesis is that benefits of screening 
receive much more attention and appreciation than harms, both with-
in research and in policymaking. This is problematic from an ethical 
perspective, since inviting asymptomatic citizens to an intervention 
they have not asked for entails a great responsibility not to cause 
more harm than good. Further, the cases of screening for malignant 
melanoma and screening for abdominal aortic aneurysm points to 
some of the fundamental problems inherent in medical thinking, sci-
ence and policy-making today. Namely; a disregard of downsides and 
harms of interventions, a negligence towards appropriate research 
methods for investigating “psychosocial” harms of medical interven-
tions, an inability to manage intellectual bias in research as well as in 
policy making, and an inability to consider inappropriate resource al-
location and opportunity costs of medical interventions in general, 
and preventive medicine in particular. Furthermore, we fail to critical-
ly reflect on the fundamental values behind the very idea to screen 
asymptomatic citizens for early stages of disease as a means to im-
prove public health. 
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Future perspective 
Thanks to the work of brilliant people, considerable progress in re-
gards to the problems outlined in the General Discussion of this the-
sis has been made. Increased attention is given to harms of screening 
(Harris 2014, Barratt 2017). For example; in the last decades the con-
cept of overdiagnosis has gone from a “shadowy idea to acknowl-
edged reality” (Barratt 2015). Measures are taken to counteract 
problems due to financial and intellectual conflicts of interests in re-
search, for example through increased transparency by registration of 
study protocols and data sharing (Glasziou 2014, Ioannidis 2014). 
The importance of independent committees with a broad representa-
tion of diverse competences when it comes to policy decisions within 
health care is increasingly acknowledged (Barratt 2017). Patient in-
volvement in research, evidence synthesis and guideline development, 
to ensure that outcomes relevant to patients are given due considera-
tion, is getting more common (Chalmers 2014). The importance of 
patient preferences is increasingly emphasised in clinical practice, for 
example through shared decision-making processes (Hoffmann 
2014).  
However, it could be argued that the problems outlined in the Gen-
eral Discussion of this thesis are already out-dated. “Precision medi-
cine” is on the verge to medicalizing almost every aspect of human 
life through it-words like genomics, proteomics and metabolomics. 
Whole-body scans and extensive gene testing is heavily marketed un-
der the pretence of enhancing personal freedom (that is for the mi-
nority of the population who can afford it). Conventional screening 
programmes for single diseases seem yesterdays matter. Likewise with 
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the mandate for health authorities to decide which screening that 
should be implemented, and which should not. With the technology 
of tomorrow, our state of health can easily be picked up (and also 
understood?) by a billion data-points, which could be read in real time 
from apps on our mobile phones. Lack of evidence for any benefit of 
such mass-scale entrance of “big data” into Western medicine does 
not seem to be an issue. In terms of harms like overdiagnosis and 
overtreatment I would like to quote the Norwegian researcher Henrik 
Vogt; “We ain’t seen nothing yet”. 
Arguably, the existential, philosophical and humanistic aspects of 
medicine are disregarded within our scientific paradigm. The down-
stream effect is a fragmentised and reductionist understanding of 
health and well-being (Kirkengen 2016). “Precision medicine” risks 
adding enormous amount of fuel to this development. But I have 
hope. The pendulum inevitably swings.  
In my opinion, Western medicine needs to remove the mask of pre-
sumed scientific neutrality and acknowledge the profound influence 
of values, not just in regards to patient preferences but in every step 
of the process of research and policy making (Kelly 2015, Carter 
2017). We should (and I believe we will) critically reflect on the deep-
er meaning and the broader consequences of what we do in medicine 
to a much larger extent, and in a much more structured way, than 
what we do today. As a reference to the picture on the cover of this 
thesis, we should go outside of the territory that the streetlights illu-
minate, equip ourselves with torches and approach the wild and rocky 
terrain that hides in the dark. Humbly keeping in mind that where we 
choose to direct our cone of light will decide what we will see.  
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Epilogue 
As I have argued in this thesis, I believe that it is fundamentally im-
portant to explore and critically reflect on the inherent values of our 
research. I will now reflect on the values underpinning my own re-
search. 
I am hesitant to the idea of screening asymptomatic people for dis-
ease or risk factors. I do think that we need to be much more careful 
when we actively interfere with the lives of asymptomatic people than 
we are today. I believe that preventive medicine is good, but only 
when it is confined to the interventions where the benefits clearly 
outweigh the harms, the ethical premises are deemed acceptable after 
careful consideration, and the consequential resource allocation is ad-
equately explored and sensible. In my opinion, this does not apply to 
many of the preventive interventions within Western medicine today. 
And it seems to me like we are heading towards accepting exceedingly 
less favourable benefit-to-harm balance when it comes to preventive 
medicine, which further exacerbates a resource allocation from those 
with the greatest need; the already ill.  
Much of these viewpoints are probably rooted in my experiences 
from working as a general practitioner. In my daily work, I feel a frus-
tration due to what I regard as an unsound and unfair use of my time. 
I spend many hours every day on preventive medicine for people 
with low risk of developing symptomatic disease. At the same time, I 
do not have enough time to adequately take care of those who need 
me the most; for example people with symptoms that could indicate 
serious disease and therefore are in need of swift work-up, or people 
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whose suffering might be soothed by a doctor who cares and takes 
time to listen.  
Furthermore, the majority of patients for whom I provide preventive 
medicine are people with rather high socioeconomic status. People 
with low socioeconomic status, or people alienated from society, do 
not seem to show up for preventive medicine at my clinic. I find this 
hugely problematic, because it augments inequity in society. Ironical-
ly, low socioeconomic status probably confers a higher risk for many 
diseases, than the risk factors that I measure and treat at my health 
care centre. Therefore, I find the social gradient in the utilization of 
preventive medicine not only unethical, but also foolish.  
Another preconception that I believe influences my research is my 
scepticism towards the prevailing reductionism within Western medi-
cine. We tend to think about our patient’s symptoms in terms of di-
agnoses, body parts or organs, and too often fail to see the whole 
person. I believe that inherent in medicine today, lies an unquestioned 
framework of medical interpretation and classification that directs our 
mind paths towards a simplified understanding of complex phenom-
ena. Our biomedical framework for understanding disease makes us 
sort our patients’ illnesses and suffering into diagnoses that may be 
technically correct but not necessarily existentially meaningful in the 
sense of enhancing the patients’ ability to engage in life.  
Further, my natural reference when it comes to screening for ab-
dominal aortic aneurysm is a patient that I have known for many 
years, who after being diagnosed with an aneurysm detected at 
screening does not dare to have sex anymore out of fear of rupture, 
and who suddenly starts to seek me repeatedly due to worries about 
multiple conditions (unrelated to the screening diagnosis) although 
being free of symptoms. Or a patient undergoing elective surgery for 
an aneurysm, with “no complications” stated in the records from the 
hospital, but yet not being able to return to his previous independent 
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life, but having to move to a nursing home. I imagine that for many 
vascular surgeons, the natural reference in regards to screening for 
abdominal aortic aneurysm is a man dying in the emergency room 
from a ruptured aneurysm, a death that might have been possible to 
avoid if only the aneurysm would have been detected in time. None 
of these references are more valid than the other. But I believe that 
the perspective we have will inevitably influence our research. I be-
lieve that my perspective has influenced the choice of the research 
questions of this thesis, the methods used, and the interpretation of 
the results. 
One aspect that I would have done differently if I had done this the-
sis all over again, is involving someone with a very different perspec-
tive than mine in the projects. Arguably, my co-authors have more or 
less the same perspective as me when it comes to screening. I did try 
to recruit a vascular surgeon to Paper IV of this thesis, but I was una-
ble to find someone willing to take part. I sympathise with this reluc-
tance. Because of the polarized environment on this issue, I would 
probably be hesitant to take part in research projects run by the 
community of vascular surgeons. 
I hope that I have hereby offered transparency about my preconcep-
tions and inherent values. I encourage readers of this thesis to critical-
ly reflect on the research findings and the arguments presented in this 
thesis, in the light of the values underpinning them. 
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